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Abstract—We study communication systems over the state-
dependent channels in the presence of a malicious state-aware
jamming adversary. The channel has a memoryless state with
an underlying distribution. The adversary introduces a jamming
signal into the channel. The message and the entire state sequence
are known non-causally to both the encoder and the adversary.
This state-aware adversary may choose an arbitrary jamming
vector depending on the message and the state vector. Taking an
Arbitrarily Varying Channel (AVC) approach, we consider two
setups, namely, the discrete memoryless Gel’fand-Pinsker (GP)
AVC and the additive white Gaussian Dirty Paper (DP) AVC.
We determine the randomized coding capacity of both the AVCs
under a maximum probability of error criterion. Similar to other
randomized coding setups, we show that the capacity is the same
even under the average probability of error criterion. Though the
adversary can choose an arbitrary vector jamming strategy, we
prove that the adversary cannot affect the rate any worse than
when it employs a memoryless strategy which depends only on
the instantaneous state. Thus, the AVC capacity characterization
is given in terms of the capacity of the worst memoryless
channels with state, induced by the adversary employing such
memoryless jamming strategies. For the DP-AVC, it is further
shown that among memoryless jamming strategies, none impact
the communication more than a memoryless Gaussian jamming
strategy which completely disregards the knowledge of the state.
Thus, the capacity of the DP-AVC equals that of a standard
AWGN channel with two independent sources of additive white
Gaussian noise, i.e., the channel noise and the jamming noise.
Index Terms—Arbitrarily varying channels, state-aware ad-
versary, refined Markov lemma, Gel’fand-Pinsker coding, dirty
paper coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of reliable communication over
a state-dependent channel in the presence of a jamming
adversary. In our generic problem setup depicted in Fig. 1,
a message M is to be communicated reliably over a channel
with an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) state
vector S and an adversarial jamming signal J. The state is
known non-causally to the encoder. The adversary too knows
M as well as state S non-causally. The encoder and decoder
share an unbounded amount of randomness, Θ, pre-shared
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Fig. 1. Our general communication system setup with a state-aware jamming
adversary.
and unknown to the adversary. We consider both the discrete
memoryless channel version and the additive white Gaussian
version of the setup as elaborated later. Our aim is to determine
the capacity of this communication system. An allied interest
is to understand the behaviour of the adversary; specifically, its
use of the knowledge of state S in the design of its jamming
strategy.
State-dependent channels, where the state is known non-
causally at the transmitter, have been a subject of considerable
interest since the seminal work of Gel’fand and Pinsker [1].
In their work, the capacity of the discrete memoryless channel
version was established. Henceforth, we refer to this channel
as the ‘Gel’fand-Pinsker (GP) channel’. Subsequently, using a
coding scheme based on the technique in [1], called the dirty
paper coding scheme, Costa [2] determined the capacity of
the Gaussian version of this problem, i.e., the capacity of an
AWGN channel with an additive white Gaussian state, where
the state is known non-causally to the encoder. Interestingly,
Costa showed that the effect of the additive state can be
completely nullified. Hence, the capacity of this dirty paper
channel was shown to be equal to that of a standard AWGN
channel without state. Thus, an intelligent use of the state
knowledge, even when available only at the encoder, enables
the user to cancel its effect. In our setup, we additionally
assume the presence of a state-aware adversary, i.e., an ad-
versary with non-causal knowledge of the state. An intelligent
adversary can use this knowledge to design a pernicious
jamming strategy. We study the impact of such an adversary
on reliable communication.
Our setup falls in the general framework of Arbitrarily
Varying Channels (AVC), and the interest lies in determining
the randomized coding capacity [3] of this setup. Note that
many works on AVCs (for instance, see [3], [4]) refer to
the adversary’s channel input J as state. However, to avoid
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2confusion, in this work we use the word state to refer
exclusively to the channel state S and refer to J as the
jamming signal. Thus, while state S is probabilistic, the
jamming signal J is adversarial. The adversary knows M and
S prior to deciding the jamming vector J. So the process of
coming up with J by the adversary can be represented by a
conditional distribution QJ|M,S, unknown to the encoder and
the decoder. Such stochastic vector jamming strategies clearly
include deterministic jamming strategies which are functions
of the message and the state vector. In addition, they capture
possible randomization used by the adversary1.
For each message, we take the maximum value of proba-
bility of error over all feasible stochastic jamming strategies
QJ|M,S. Further, our error criterion is the maximum (over mes-
sages) probability of error (see (1) for the expression) and we
determine the randomized capacity under this error criterion.
Note that the deterministic coding capacity problem in this
setting is a hard problem2, and not addressed in this work.
Hence, unless stated otherwise, the term capacity will hereafter
refer to the randomized capacity3. The adversary is aware of
the state and the message, and furthermore, is assumed to
also know the distribution of the randomized code. However,
this randomized code is generated using randomness which is
shared only between the encoder and decoder, and thus, its
exact realization is unknown to the adversary. In particular,
owing to the randomized encoding map the adversary does
not know the transmitted codeword even though it knows the
message. In this work, we consider two variants of the setup:
the discrete memoryless Gel’fand-Pinsker AVC (GP-AVC) and
the additive white Gaussian Dirty Paper AVC (DP-AVC), and
determine their randomized capacity. As in many randomized
coding setups (for instance, see [4], [5]), we show that the
capacity is the same even under an average (over messages)
probability of error criterion.
Subsequent to [9], where the AVC model was introduced,
several works analysed different AVC models. In general, the
capacity of an AVC communication system depends upon
several factors, viz., possibility of randomization (unknown
to the adversary) at the encoder/decoder, the probability of
error criterion, assumptions on the adversary’s knowledge,
etc. [3]. In the absence of state constraints, it is known that
the deterministic coding capacity under average error criterion
of the AVC exhibits a dichotomy - it is zero if the AVC is
symmetrizable or is equal to the randomized coding capacity
otherwise [10, Theorem 1]. An AVC WY |X,J , where X ∈ X ,
J ∈ J and Y ∈ Y , is said to be symmetrizable if for some
conditional distribution VJ|X
1 In fact, without loss of generality, we may restrict attention to determin-
istic jamming strategies; see footnote 4 on page 4. However, as in [5], in this
paper we will consider stochastic jamming strategies. This is in the interest
of simpler converse proofs.
2 Even in the absence of the state S, the deterministic coding capacity under
maximum probability of error criterion is related (cf. [6], [7]) to Shannon’s
zero-error capacity [8], whose characterization is known to be a hard problem.
3In fact, this capacity remains unchanged for the average probability of
error criterion. See Remark 2 on page 5.
∑
j
WY |X,J(y|x, j)VJ|X(j|x′)
=
∑
j
WY |X,J(y|x′, j)VJ|X(j|x), for every x, x′, y.
However, the deterministic coding capacity under the maxi-
mum error criterion, of which Shannon’s zero error capacity
problem [8] is a special case, is not known in general [6], [7].
For a lucid exposition on AVCs and a survey of many useful
results, see [3].
To provide context to our work, we review certain im-
portant results. In the standard point to point AVC setup
under randomized coding, models of adversary ranging from
the oblivious adversary (no knowledge of the codeword) to
the codeword-aware adversary have been considered [4], [9],
[11]. More generally, the myopic adversary which observes
a noisy version of the codeword is analysed in [12], [13].
The Gaussian versions of these problems [5], [14], [15] have
also been considered. An adversary with a causal view of
the codeword [16] or a delayed view of the codeword [17],
has also been studied. The capacity of an AVC version of
the Gel’fand-Pinsker problem under deterministic coding is
determined by Ahlswede [18]. Unlike our setup, this model
has only an adversarial state (known to the encoder), but does
not have an additional probabilistic state. The case where
the decoder too is aware of the state is considered in [19].
A model similar to our DP-AVC, but with a state-oblivious
adversary under deterministic coding, is analysed in [20]. The
result under randomized coding also appears there without
proof. Our models have a stronger, state-aware, adversary.
Communication setups involving both jamming and secrecy
have been studied in [13], [21], [22]. Achievability results for
secret communication over the Gel’fand-Pinsker wiretap setup
too have recently appeared [23].
Closely related to our problem are also problems on
information hiding. Information hiding finds application in
watermarking, fingerprinting, steganography, etc. (cf. [24],
[25]). An information-theoretic approach to the problem of
information hiding appears in [26], where information hiding
under distortion-attack adversaries is studied. Further results
on such watermarking games can be found in subsequent
works like [27]–[29] and some of the references therein. How-
ever, there are important differences between these problems
and our problem. In a generic watermarking game depicted
in Fig. 2 (also see, for instance, [27, Fig. 2]), the aim is to
reliably communicate a message M over a channel controlled
by an adversary, by embedding it into a covertext source (state
S), like an image. The embedding process distorts S, and the
resulting data X, called stegotext, is directly observed by the
adversary. The adversary, who may or may not know S, is
capable of distortion attacks, and hence, can further distort
this text arbitrarily but within some overall distortion limit
(adversary’s power constraint). In the watermarking game,
unlike in our problem, the adversary knows the distorted
covertext, and thus, can correlate with and cancel it, partially
or fully, depending on its power. On the other hand, in our
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Fig. 2. The watermarking game setup [27].
setup the adversary knows the covertext (i.e. state S) but not
X. Equivalently, this means that the adversary is state-aware
but not aware of the transmitted vector. This difference has
a major effect on the behaviour of the adversary as well as
the capacity of the system. In the Gaussian analogue of the
watermarking problem, considered for instance in [27], it is
seen that a sufficiently strong adversary can force the capacity
of this distortion attack channel to zero. On the contrary, it will
be shown that for our setup, the capacity is always greater than
zero for any finite value of adversary’s power.
A. Contribution and Organization of the Paper
In Section II, we begin by describing the notation used in
this work, and then present our communication setups, viz., the
discrete Gel’fand-Pinsker AVC (GP-AVC) and the Gaussian
Dirty Paper AVC (DP-AVC). We state our main results in
Section III. Here is a summary of our contributions.
• We present the capacity of the Gel’fand-Pinsker AVC
(GP-AVC) in Theorem 1. Though the adversary is al-
lowed to use an arbitrary vector jamming strategy, the
AVC capacity is characterized through the capacity of
the worst Gel’fand-Pinsker channel that the adversary
can induce using a memoryless strategy. Towards proving
our result, we also present a Refined Markov Lemma
(Lemma 8). This lemma is a refined version of [30,
Lemma 12.1] and may also be useful in analysing other
systems with adversaries (see Remark 9(i) on page 8).
Our converse considers a memoryless (but not identically
distributed) jamming strategy, which depends on the
encoder design, to upper bound the rate.
• We present the capacity of the Dirty Paper AVC (DP-
AVC) in Theorem 6. Interestingly, it is shown that the
adversary, given its purpose, cannot do better than choos-
ing an adversarial strategy that completely disregards the
state knowledge and essentially performs i.i.d. Gaussian
jamming, independent of the state. Here the user em-
ploys an appropriate dirty paper coding scheme. As a
consequence, the capacity of this channel is shown to be
equal to that of a standard AWGN channel with no state
which has two independent sources of zero mean additive
white Gaussian noises, one with variance σ2 and the
other with Λ. Note that a result on the Gaussian version
of the dirty paper coding setup with a state-oblivious
adversary appears in [20] without proof. However, we
prove the same capacity for a state-aware adversary, and
thus, our result subsumes the result for the state-oblivious
adversary.
• As known in other randomized coding setups, we observe
(see Remark 2 on page 5) that for both the GP-AVC
and the DP-AVC, the capacity is identical under both the
maximum and average probability of error criteria.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 6 are given in Section IV.
We discuss some implications of our work and make overall
concluding remarks in Section V. The proofs of other auxiliary
lemmas are given in the appendices.
II. NOTATION AND PROBLEM SETUP
A. Notation
We denote random variables by upper case letters (e.g.
X), the values they take by lower case letters (e.g. x) and
their alphabets by calligraphic letters (e.g. X ). We assume
all discrete random variables to have alphabets of finite size,
unless stated otherwise. The continuous random variables take
values in the set of real numbers R. Let R+ denote the set
of non-negative real numbers. We use boldface notation to
denote random vectors (e.g. X) and their values (e.g. x). Here
the vectors are of length n (e.g. X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn)),
where n is the block length of operation. Let us also denote
Xi = (X1, X2, . . . , Xi) and xi = (x1, x2, . . . , xi) as well
as Xki = (Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xk) and x
k
i = (xi, xi+1, . . . , xk).
We use the l∞ norm for discrete vectors and the l2 norm
for continuous vectors. We denote the former by ‖.‖∞ and
the latter by ‖.‖, where we drop the subscript. For a set X ,
let P(X ) be the set of all probability distributions on X .
Similarly, let us write as P(X|Y), the set of all conditional
distributions of a random variable with alphabet X conditioned
on another random variable with alphabet Y . Let X and Y
be two random variables. Then, we denote the distribution of
X by PX(·), the joint distribution of (X,Y ) by PXY (·, ·)
and the conditional distribution of X given Y by PX|Y (·|·).
Distributions corresponding to strategies adopted by the ad-
versary are denoted by Q instead of P for clarity. In cases
where the subscripts are clear from the context, we sometimes
omit them to keep the notation simple. For an event E, let
P(E) denote the probability of E. Functions will be denoted
in lowercase letters (e.g. f ). A Gaussian distribution with mean
µ and variance σ2 is denoted by N (µ, σ2). All logarithms are
with base 2, and hence, all rates and capacities are expressed
in bits.
B. The Gel’fand-Pinsker AVC (GP-AVC)
In the communication setup depicted in Fig. 1, there is an
arbitrarily varying channel with input X , output Y , state S,
and an input J of an adversary. These random variables take
values in the finite sets X , Y , S, and J respectively. The
states in different channel uses are i.i.d. with distribution PS .
We assume without loss of generality that PS(s) > 0, ∀s ∈ S.
The channel behaviour is given by the conditional distribution
WY |X,S,J . A standard block-coding framework is considered
where a message M is communicated over n channel uses.
Let Xi, Yi, Si and Ji denote the symbols of the respective
random variables associated with the i-th channel use. The
4encoder as well as the adversary are assumed to know the
state vector S non-causally before deciding their input vectors
X and J respectively. The encoder and the decoder share
unlimited common randomness Θ, unknown to the adversary.
Thus, the transmitted vector X is a function of M , S and Θ.
Hence, we consider randomized coding. Similarly, the state-
aware adversary chooses its own channel input J. Let the
distribution used by the adversary be denoted by QJ|M,S. Note
that the adversary does not have knowledge of Θ. For a given
x, s and j, the channel output y is observed over the channel
WY |X,S,J with probability given by
P(Y = y|X = x,S = s,J = j) =
n∏
i=1
WY |X,S,J(yi|xi, si, ji).
We call this channel the Gel’fand-Pinsker AVC (GP-AVC).
An (n,R) deterministic code of block length n and rate R is
a pair (ψ, φ) of mappings with encoder ψ : {1, 2, . . . , 2nR}×
Sn → Xn and decoder φ : Yn → {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2nR}, where an
output of 0 indicates that the decoder declares an error. Here
we have assumed 2nR to be an integer. The vector transmitted
on the channel is given by X = ψ(M,S).
An (n,R) randomized code of block length n and rate R
is a random variable (Θ in this case) which takes values in
the set of (n,R) deterministic codes. Let the pair Θ = (Ψ,Φ)
denote the encoder-decoder for the (n,R) randomized code.
In this case, the transmitted vector is given by X = Ψ(M,S).
For this (n,R) randomized code, the maximum probability
of error is4
P (n)e = max
m
max
QJ|M=m,S
P(Φ(Y) 6= m|M = m), (1)
where the probability is over the state S, the adversary’s action
J, the channel behavior and Θ = (Ψ,Φ). The rate R is
achievable if for any  > 0, there exists an (n,R) randomized
code for some n such that the corresponding P (n)e is less than
. We define the capacity of the GP-AVC as the supremum of
all achievable rates.
C. The Dirty Paper AVC (DP-AVC)
The communication channel depicted in Fig. 3 is a Gaussian
arbitrarily varying channel with an additive white Gaussian
state and an additive jamming interference. The encoder
and decoder share an unbounded amount of common ran-
domness Θ, unknown to the adversary. Let us denote by
Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn), the signal received at the decoder.
Then,
Y = X+ S+ J+ Z,
4It is clear that, without loss of generality, we may assume that the adversary
is deterministic, and not stochastic. Specifically, for a given (m, s), the
optimal jamming signal is given by
arg max
j
P(Φ(Y) 6= m|M = m,S = s,J = j),
where the probability is over Θ and the channel WY |X,S,J (if there are
multiple maximizers, one among them may be chosen arbitrarily). Hence,
capacity of GP-AVC defined here is the same under stochastic and determin-
istic jamming. This not withstanding, we will proceed to consider stochastic
adversaries in this paper. This makes some of the converse proofs in the sequel
slightly simpler.
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Fig. 3. The Dirty Paper AVC (DP-AVC) communication setup.
where X, S, J and Z are the encoder’s input to the channel,
the additive white Gaussian state, adversary’s channel input
and the channel noise respectively. The components of S are
i.i.d. with Si ∼ N (0, σ2S) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The components
of Z are i.i.d. with Zi ∼ N (0, σ2), ∀i. Similar to the GP-AVC,
the state vector S is known non-causally to both the encoder
and the adversary, but it is not known to the decoder. Hence,
the encoder’s output X is a function of M , S and Θ. We call
this channel the Dirty Paper AVC (DP-AVC). The encoder
has a power constraint P , i.e. ‖X‖2 ≤ nP . Similarly, the
adversary’s power constraint is Λ, such that ‖J‖2 ≤ nΛ. Let
J (Λ) = {j : ‖j‖2 ≤ nΛ} denote the set of feasible jamming
signals.
An (n,R, P ) deterministic code of block length n, rate R
and average power P is a pair (ψ, φ) of encoder map ψ :
{1, 2, . . . , 2nR} × Rn → Rn, such that ‖ψ(m, s)‖2 ≤ nP ,
∀m, s, and decoder map φ : Rn → {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2nR}, where
an output of 0 indicates that the decoder declares an error.
Here we have assumed 2nR to be an integer. The transmitted
vector is given by X = ψ(M,S).
An (n,R, P ) randomized code is a random variable (Ψ,Φ)
which forms the shared randomness Θ and takes values in
the set of (n,R, P ) deterministic codes. Here the transmitted
vector is given by X = Ψ(M,S). For an (n,R, P ) randomized
code with encoder-decoder pair (Ψ,Φ), the maximum proba-
bility of error is
P (n)e = max
m
max
QJ|M=m,S:J∈J (Λ)
P (Φ(Y) 6= m|M = m) , (2)
where the probability is over the state S, the adversary’s
action J, the channel behavior and Θ = (Ψ,Φ). The rate
R is achievable if for every  > 0, there exists an (n,R, P )
randomized code for some n such that P (n)e is less than  .
We define the capacity of the DP-AVC as the supremum of
all achievable rates.
III. THE MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results. Theorem 1
characterizes the capacity of the GP-AVC while Theorem 6
determines the capacity of the DP-AVC.
Given a state distribution PS and for fixed distributions
PU,X|S and QJ|S , let I(U ;Y ) and I(U ;S) denote respec-
tively, the mutual information quantities evaluated with respect
to the corresponding marginals PU,Y and PU,S . In the follow-
ing theorem, let U denote the alphabet of U .
5Theorem 1. [GP-AVC Capacity] The capacity of the Gel’fand
Pinsker AVC is5
C = max
PU|S , x(·,·)
min
QJ|S
(I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)) , (3)
where PU |S ∈ P(U|S), x : U × S → X , QJ|S ∈ P(J |S),
and |U| ≤ |X ||S|.
The proof of this result is presented in Section IV.
Remark 2. Though the capacity is stated for the maximum
probability of error criterion, the converse is proved for the
average probability of error as defined in (6). On the other
hand, the achievability under maximum probability of error
also implies the achievability under average probability of er-
ror. Thus, the GP-AVC capacity under the average probability
of error criterion is the same as in (3).
This fact can also be seen directly from the definition itself.
Clearly, capacity under average probability of error criterion
cannot be smaller than that under maximum probability of er-
ror criterion. To see that the capacities must be the same, given
a code with a certain average probability of error P¯e, we can
obtain a code whose probability of error under each message
is P¯e and hence whose maximal probability is P¯e. This can
be done by simply using a part of the shared randomness Θ
to uniformly permute the messages. Specifically, a uniformly
random permutation Π : {1, . . . , 2nR} → {1, . . . , 2nR} is
chosen using a part of Θ, and to send message m, the per-
muted message Πm is sent using the encoder which guarantees
average probability of error P¯e. At the receiver the inverse map
Π−1 is applied to the output of the decoder.
The above argument also shows how the adversary’s knowl-
edge of M can be rendered essentially useless. Indeed, for
an encoder-decoder pair which uses a random permutation
as above, the optimal QJ|M,S must be such that it does not
depend on M , in other words, it must be of the form QJ|S.
Since the above random permutation can always be used
without resulting in an increase in the maximal (and average)
probability of error, it is clear that the capacity under a state-
aware adversary who also knows the message M is the same
as that under a state-aware adversary who does not know the
message.
Remark 3. Every memoryless jamming strategy QJ|S induces
some GP channel VY |X,S . Thus, (3) can be expressed through
the capacity of the worst memoryless channel that the adver-
sary can induce through a memoryless strategy, i.e,
C = max
PU|S , x(·,·)
min
VY |X,S
(I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)) .
Here
VY |X,S(y|x, s) =
∑
j
WY |X,S,J(y|x, s, j)QJ|S(j|s),
where QJ|S ∈ P(J |S).
5The max-min exists as mutual information I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;S) is a
continuous function of these variables which take values over a compact set.
Remark 4. Recall that the standard GP channel capacity [1]
is given by
C = max
PU,X|S
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)
= max
PU|S , x(·,·)
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S). (4)
The standard argument for the reduction to (4) uses the fact
that (I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)) is a convex function of PX|U,S for
a fixed distribution PU |S [30]. For the GP-AVC, though,
such an approach fails as minQJ|S (I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)) is
not necessarily a convex function of PX|U,S for a fixed PU |S .
However, in the proof of the converse of Theorem 1, we use
a different approach to show that such a simplification is still
possible for the GP-AVC.
Remark 5. Our bound on |U| in Theorem 1 follows from the
set of Shannon strategies [30, Remark 7.6] at the encoder as
there exist up to |X ||S| functions from S to X . The details
can be seen in the proof of the converse. In the standard GP
channel, where the GP channel is fixed, a stronger bound of
|U| ≤ |X | · |S| is known to hold using Support lemma [31,
Lemma 15.4] (which uses Carathe´odory’s theorem). However,
we cannot use the Support lemma for the GP-AVC because
the statistics of U depend upon the statistics of the output Y
and the adversary can induce any of the infinitely many GP
channels.
Our next result gives the capacity of the Dirty Paper AVC.
Theorem 6. [DP-AVC Capacity] The capacity6 of the Dirty
Paper AVC is
C =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
Λ + σ2
)
. (5)
The proof is given in Section IV. This result again im-
plies that essentially a memoryless strategy is optimal for
the adversary. Unlike in the case of the GP-AVC, here the
adversary completely disregards the knowledge of the state.
The adversary essentially inputs i.i.d. Gaussian jamming noise
independent of the state. The effect of the additive random
state (S) is completely eliminated as in the standard dirty
paper channel, and the capacity of the DP-AVC equals that
of the dirty paper channel considered by Costa in [2] where
the noise variance is (Λ + σ2).
IV. PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 1: The Gel’fand-Pinsker AVC Capacity
In this section, we first discuss the converse for the
Gel’fand-Pinsker AVC capacity theorem and then give a proof
of achievability.
1) Converse: In the following, we prove the converse for an
average probability of error criterion instead of the maximum
probability of error criterion. For this stronger version of the
converse, let the average probability of error be
P (n)e =
1
2nR
2nR∑
m=1
P (n)e,m, (6)
6For the same reason as explained in Remark 2, the capacity is the same
under both maximum error probability and average error probability criteria.
6where
P (n)e,m = max
QJ|M=m,S
P (Φ(Y) 6= m|M = m) .
To prove our converse, we will consider a specific memoryless
(but not i.i.d.) jamming strategy, which depends on the ran-
domized code (although as discussed in Section I, the actual
realization of the encoding map is unknown to the adversary),
and upper bound the rate of reliable communication possible
under this strategy of the adversary.
Our proof starts along the lines of the standard Gel’fand-
Pinsker converse [1]. Let us consider any sequence of codes
with rate R and P (n)e → 0 as n → ∞. We know from
Fano’s inequality that for such a sequence of codes, we have
H(M |Y,Θ) ≤ nn, where n → 0 as n→∞. Then,
nR = H(M)
= I(M ;Y,Θ) +H(M |Y,Θ)
≤ I(M ;Y,Θ) + nn
= I(M ; Θ) +
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Yi|Yi−1,Θ) + nn
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Yi|Yi−1,Θ) + nn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,Yi−1,Θ;Yi) + nn
=
n∑
i=1
(
I(M,Sni+1,Y
i−1,Θ;Yi)
−I(Sni+1;Yi|M,Yi−1,Θ)
)
+ nn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(M,Sni+1,Y
i−1,Θ;Yi)
−I(Yi−1;Si|M,Sni+1,Θ)) + nn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(M,Sni+1,Y
i−1,Θ;Yi)
−I(M,Sni+1,Yi−1,Θ;Si)) + nn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Si)) + nn
= n
(
n∑
i=1
1
n
(I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Si))
)
+ nn (7)
Here we get (a) as M and Θ are independent, and (b) follows
from Csisza´r’s sum identity [30, pg. 25]. The independence of
(M,Sni+1,Θ) and Si gives (c), and (d) follows by denoting
Ui = (M,S
n
i+1,Y
i−1,Θ).
Given the randomized encoding map, we analyze the per-
formance under a memoryless jamming strategy of the form
QJ|M,S(j|m, s) :=
n∏
i=1
QJi|Si(ji|si),
where QJi|Si are described sequentially for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
below. Note that under such a memoryless jamming strategy,
Ui → (Xi, Si) → Yi is a Markov chain for all i. Before
specifying QJi|Si , we first note that, given QJk|Sk for k =
1, 2, . . . , i− 1,
PUi,Xi|Si(Ui = ui, Xi = xi|Si = si)
(a)
= P(M,Θ,Sni+1,Yi−1),Xi|Si((m, θ, s
n
i+1,y
i−1), xi|si) (8)
Here we have substituted Ui = (M,Θ,Sni+1,Y
i−1) and ui =
(m, θ, sni+1,y
i−1) in (a). Simplifying (8) further we get (9),
given on top of the next page, from which it clearly follows
that PUi,Xi|Si depends on the randomized encoding map (in
particular, on PXi|M,Θ,S) as well as QJk|Sk : k = 1, 2, · · · , i−
1, but it does not depend on QJi|Si . We now define QJi|Si
inductively as follows. Given QJk|Sk : k = 1, 2, · · · , i − 1
and PUi,Xi|Si , let QJi|Si be the minimizer of (I(Ui;Yi) −
I(Ui;Si)). Hence, from (7) we have,
nR ≤ n
(
n∑
i=1
1
n
min
QJi|Si
(I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Si))
)
+ nn,
for PUi,Xi|Si , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Further, note that for i =
1, 2, . . . , n,
min
QJi|Si
(I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Si))
≤ max
PUi,Xi|Si
min
QJi|Si
(I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Si)) . (10)
Here the maximization is over all conditional distributions
PUi,Xi|Si with finite alphabet U of Ui. This inequality holds
because the fixed PUi,Xi|Si (induced by the code) on the LHS
is such a distribution. Since the channel is memoryless, the
RHS in (10) does not depend on i, and thus we have
R ≤ max
PU,X|S
min
QJ|S
(I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)) + n.
Since this holds for all n, and n → 0 as n→∞, we have
R ≤ max
PU,X|S
min
QJ|S
(I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)) . (11)
We now show that it is sufficient to perform the maximiza-
tion in (11) over distributions PU |S and functions x : U×S →
X , i.e.,
max
PU,X|S
min
QJ|S
(I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S))
= max
PU|S , x(·,·)
min
QJ|S
(I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)) . (12)
Let us fix the conditional distribution PU |S . We know from the
functional representation lemma [30, pg. 626] that there exists
a random variable W which is independent of (U, S) such that
X is a function of (W,U, S). Let us define U ′ = (U,W ) and
denote its alphabet by U ′, then we have PU ′|S((u,w)|s) =
PU |S(u|s)PW (w). Let the function be denoted by x : U ′ ×
S → X . Note that U ′ → (X,S) → Y is a Markov chain.
Then,
I(U ′;S) = I(U,W ;S)
= I(U ;S) + I(W ;S|U)
= I(U ;S), (13)
where the last equality follows from W ⊥⊥ (U, S). Further,
7PUi,Xi|Si(Ui = ui, Xi = xi|Si = si) =
∑
si−1,xi−1
PM,Θ,Si−1,Sni+1,Yi−1,Xi−1,Xi|Si(m, θ, s
i−1, sni+1,y
i−1,xi−1, xi|si)
=
∑
si−1,xi−1
PM (m)PΘ(θ)PSi−1(s
i−1)PSni+1(s
n
i+1)PXi|M,Θ,S((x
i−1, xi)|m, θ, s)
·
 i−1∏
m=1
∑
jm
PY |X,S,J(ym|xm, sm, jm)QJm|Sm(jm|sm)
 . (9)
for any QJ|S ∈ P(J |S),
I(U ′;Y ) = I(U,W ;Y )
= I(U ;Y ) + I(W ;Y |U)
≥ I(U ;Y ),
and hence,
min
QJ|S
I(U ′;Y ) ≥ min
QJ|S
I(U ;Y ). (14)
From (13) and (14), it then follows that
min
QJ|S
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) ≤ min
QJ|S
I(U ′;Y )− I(U ′;S).
Here the LHS is evaluated under a conditional distribution
PX|U,S and the RHS under the corresponding PU ′|S and x :
U ′ × S → X . Since the inequality holds for any PX|U,S , we
have (12), and thus
R ≤ max
PU|S , x(u,s)
min
QJ|S
(I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)) . (15)
For the bound on the cardinality of U , we use the Shannon
strategy approach in a similar manner, for example, as in the
context of channels with state with causal knowledge of the
state at the encoder [30, Remark 7.6]. In particular, the max-
imization over functions x(u, s) in (15) can be equivalently
viewed as a maximization over functions xu : S → X ;u ∈ U .
Since there are exactly |X ||S| such distinct functions, without
loss of generality, we can restrict U to be of cardinality at
most |X ||S|. This completes the proof of the converse.
2) Achievability: To begin, let us introduce some useful
notation. Given x, y, the type of x will be denoted by Tx,
the joint type of (x,y) by Tx,y and the conditional type of x
given y by Tx|y. Here ∀(x, y) such that Ty(y) > 0,
Tx|y(x, y) =
Tx,y(x, y)
Ty(y)
.
For any  ∈ (0, 1), the set of -typical sequences x for a
distribution PX is
T n (PX) = {x : ‖Tx − PX‖∞ ≤ }, (16)
where ‖.‖∞ is the l∞ norm. For a joint distribution PX,Y
and x ∈ Xn, the set of conditionally -typical sequences y,
conditioned on x, is defined as
T n (PX,Y |x) = {y : ‖Tx,y − PX,Y ‖∞ ≤ }.
We use randomized Gel’fand-Pinsker coding scheme [1],
which involves an auxiliary random variable denoted by U .
We choose a rate R < C, where C is as given in (3). Consider
a conditional distribution PU |S and a function x : U ×S → X
with X = x(U, S) such that
R < min
QJ|S
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S).
Note that here QJ|S takes values from all conditional distri-
butions in P(J |S), and the encoder and the decoder clearly
know this set.
Code construction:
• We generate a binned codebook C comprising 2nRU =
2n(R+R˜) vectors Uj,k, where j = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR and
k = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR˜. R˜ ≥ 0 will be defined later. Here
j indicates the bin index while k indicates the position
within the bin. There are 2nR bins with each bin con-
taining 2nR˜ codewords. Every codeword Uj,k is chosen
independently and uniformly at random from T nδ (PU )
(the choice of δ > 0 will be discussed later), where
PU (u) =
∑
s
PU |S(u, s)PS(s),∀u.
The codebook is shared between the encoder and decoder
as the shared randomness Θ.
Encoding:
• Given a message m and having observed the state S, the
encoder looks within the bin m for some Um,k such that
‖TUm,k,S − PU,S‖∞ ≤ δ1(δ), (17)
for some δ1(δ) > 0 (the choice of δ1(δ) will be discussed
later). Here PU,S = PU |SPS . The condition (17) implies
that Um,k and S are jointly typical according to PU,S .
If no such Um,k is found, then the encoder selects U1,1.
If more than one Um,k satisfying (17) exists, then the
encoder chooses one uniformly at random from amongst
them. Let U denote the chosen codeword.
• The encoder then generates X, where Xi = x(Ui, Si),
i = 1, 2, . . . , n are independent, and transmits it over the
channel.
Decoding:
• When y is received at the decoder and given some fixed
parameter γ(δ) > 0 (the choice of γ(δ) will be discussed
later), the decoder determines the set
L(y, γ(δ)) =
{
u ∈ C :∃QJ|S ∈ P(J |S)
s.t. ‖Tu,y − P (Q)U,Y ‖∞ ≤ γ(δ)
}
,
8where for QJ|S ∈ P(J |S),
P
(Q)
U,Y (u, y) =
∑
x,s,j
PS(s)PU |S(u|s)1{X=x(U,S)}
· WY |X,S,J(y|x, s, j)QJ|S(j|s),∀(u, y).
Here the decoder lists all codewords u ∈ C which
are jointly typical with y according to P (Q)U,Y , for some
QJ|S ∈ P(J |S).
• If L(y, γ(δ)) is not empty and all the bin indices of the
codewords in it are identical, then the decoder outputs
the common bin index m˜. Otherwise, it declares an error
by setting m˜ = 0.
Probability of error analysis:
A decoding error occurs if either the chosen codeword Um,k is
not jointly typical with Y or some other codeword Um′,k′ , for
some m′ 6= m and k′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR}, is jointly typical with
Y. Here the typicality is according to P (Q)U,Y , for some QJ|S ∈
P(J |S). We show that the probability of this decoding error
event is vanishing as n→∞. Let  > 0 be such that
R = min
QJ|S
(I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S))− ,
and
R˜ = I(U ;S) + /2.
Recall from earlier that RU = R+ R˜, and hence,
RU = min
QJ|S
I(U ;Y )− /2.
Let E = {M˜ 6= M} denote the decoding error event. Let the
message sent be M = m and let U = Um,k denote the chosen
codeword. Then, we have
P( E|M = m)
= P(U 6∈ L(Y, γ(δ))|M = m)
+P(∃m′, k′ : m′ 6= m,Um′,k′ ∈ L(Y, γ(δ))|M = m).
From (1), we have
P (n)e = max
m
max
QJ|m,S
P(E|M = m),
and thus,
P (n)e ≤ max
m
max
QJ|m,S
P(U 6∈ L(Y, γ(δ))|M = m)
+ max
m
max
QJ|m,S
P(∃m′, k′ : m′ 6= m,
Um′,k′ ∈ L(Y, γ(δ))|M = m). (18)
We will show that for any  > 0, we can find a δ > 0 such
that both the terms go to zero as n→∞.
We now state some useful results which are required to
bound the terms in the RHS of (18). Recall from (17) that
δ1(δ) is the parameter which appears in the definition of the
encoder. The following claim specifies this δ1(δ) parameter.
Claim 7. If R˜ > I(U ;S), then there exists δ1 : R+ → R+,
where δ1(δ) → 0 as δ → 0, such that the probability that
the encoder finds at least one Um,k such that (Um,k,S) ∈
T nδ1(PU,S) approaches 1 as n→∞.
This result follows from the use of the covering lemma, the
proof of which is along the lines of the proof of [30, Lemma
3.3]. To bound the first term in (18), we will consider the
conditional type TJ|S of J given S 7. As S is i.i.d. with Si ∼
PS , ∀i, it follows that the pair (S,J) will be jointly typical
according to PSTJ|S with high probability. We next present
a lemma which is a refined version of the Markov Lemma
in [30, Lemma 12.1]. This lemma will be used later (with
X → J , Y → S, and Z → U ) to conclude that (S,J,U) are
jointly typical according to PSTJ|SPU |S with high probability.
Lemma 8 (Refined Markov Lemma). Suppose X → Y → Z
is a Markov chain, i.e., PX,Y,Z = PY PX|Y PZ|Y . Let (x,y) ∈
T nδ0 (PX,Y ) and Z ∼ PZ be such that
(a) for some  > 0,
P
(
(y,Z) 6∈ T nδ0 (PY,Z)
) ≤ ,
(b) for every z ∈ T nδ0 (PY,Z |y),
2−n(H(Z|Y )+g(δ0)) ≤ PZ(z) ≤ 2−n(H(Z|Y )−g(δ0)),
for some g : R+ → R+, where g(δ0)→ 0 as δ0 → 0.
Then, there exists δ : R+ → R+, where δ(δ0)→ 0 as δ0 → 0,
such that
P
(
(x,y,Z) 6∈ T nδ(δ0) (PX,Y,Z)
)
≤ 2|X ||Y||Z|e−nK + .
Here K > 0 and K does not depend on n, PX,Y , PZ or (x,y)
but does depend on δ0, g and PZ|Y . Further, the δ function
does not depend on (x,y), PX,Y or PZ.
The proof of the lemma is presented in Appendix A.
Remark 9. (i) The Refined Markov lemma is a refinement of
the Markov lemma [30]. Markov lemma gives the bound (see
the proof in [30, Appendix 12A])
P( (x,y,Z) 6∈ T nδ (PX,Y,Z))
≤ 2(n+ 1)22ng(δ0)e−n(δ−g(δ0))2PminX,Y,Z/(3(1+g(δ0))),
where
PminX,Y,Z := min
(x,y,z):PX,Y,Z(x,y,z)>0
P (x, y, z),
and δ > 0 is a constant. On the other hand, Lemma 8 gives
a bound which does not depend on PX,Y .
This refinement is crucial in our proof of achievability.
Here the lemma will be used (in the proof of Claim 12)
replacing X → J , Y → S and Z → U . Thus, we have
the Markov chain J → S → U with PJ,S,U = PJ,SPU |S .
For a given j and s, we will take their joint type Tj,s as the
distribution PJ,S . Since j is decided by the adversary based
on their non-causal knowledge of s, the joint type Tj,s can
have non-zero components as small as 1/n. This can be easily
caused by the adversary by enforcing a pair of values (j, s)
only once in the length-n pair of vectors. In such cases, the
original Markov lemma does not guarantee any useful bound
7 In fact, it will be be clear through the proof that even though the adversary
can employ arbitrary vector jamming strategies of the form QJ|M,S, its
impact is completely captured through the conditional type TJ|S ∈ P(J |S).
See the proof of Lemma 10 for details.
9on the probability P ((j, s,U) 6∈ T nδ (PJ,S,U )). We believe that
for similar reasons, our version of the Markov lemma may
also be useful in achievability proofs in other systems with
adversaries.
(ii) Another minor difference from the Markov lemma is
that we use a slightly different notion of typicality (16) than
the one used in [30]. This makes the analysis easier in the
second part of the proof of Lemma 10. However, the Refined
Markov lemma can also be proved under the typicality notion
used in [30] along the lines of our proof.
The following lemma bounds the two components of the
probability of error in (18).
Lemma 10. Let the message be M = m. There exist γ, γ˜ :
R+ → R+, where γ(δ), γ˜(δ)→ 0 as δ → 0, such that for any
jamming strategy QJ|M,S,
(i) for n independent of m, where n → 0 as n→∞
P(U 6∈ L(Y, γ(δ))|M = m) ≤ n,
(ii) if U′ ∼ Unif (T nδ (PU )), independent of (U,S,X,J,Y),
then
P
(
U′ ∈ L(Y, γ(δ))|M = m)
≤ 2−n
(
minQJ|S I(U ;Y )−γ˜(δ)
)
.
Before we prove this lemma, we complete the proof of
achievability. The proof of Lemma 10 follows immediately
after and concludes this section. Claim 7 and Lemma 8
(Refined Markov lemma) are used in the proof of Lemma 10.
Coming back to the probability of error analysis, note that the
first part of Lemma 10 implies that as n→∞, the first term
in the RHS in (18) goes to zero. For the second RHS term,
we have for any QJ|M,S,
P(∃m′, k′ : m′ 6= m,Um′,k′ ∈ L(Y, γ(δ))|M = m)
(a)
≤
∑
m′ 6=m, k′
P (Um′,k′ ∈ L(Y, γ(δ))|M = m)
≤ 2nRUP (Um′,k′ ∈ L(Y, γ(δ))|M = m)
(b)
≤ 2nRU 2−n
(
minQJ|S I(U ;Y )−γ˜(δ)
)
.
Here we get (a) using the union bound while (b) follows
from the second part of Lemma 10. Thus, by choosing a small
enough δ such that
RU < min
QJ|S
I(U ;Y )− γ˜(δ),
it follows that the second term in the RHS of (18) can be made
to go to 0 as n→∞. This implies that P (n)e → 0 as n→ 0,
and hence, concludes the proof of achievability.
Now, it only remains to prove Lemma 10. For the proof
of the first part of this lemma, we begin by stating a few
useful claims. Recall our assumption that PS(s) > 0, ∀s. In
the following, when we write s ∈ T nδ0(PS) we assume that δ0
is small enough and n large enough such that Ts(s) > 0, ∀s.
Hence, we may write
Tj|s(j|s) = Ts,j(s, j)
Ts(s)
,∀(s, j).
It will be seen through the following claims that the effect of
the jamming input given the underlying adversarial strategy is
completely captured through this conditional type Tj|s.
Claim 11. Let (s, j) be a pair of vectors where s ∈ T nδ0(PS).
Then, (s, j) ∈ T nδ0(PSTj|s).
The proof is straightforward, and hence, omitted. Now, we
note that under the event that the encoder succeeds in finding
a typical U codeword, U ∼ Unif (T nδ1(PU,S |s)) conditioned
on M = m.
Claim 12. Let (s, j) ∈ T nδ1(PSTj|s). Then, there exists some
δ2(δ1) > 0, where δ2(δ1) → 0 as δ1 → 0, such that if U ∼
Unif
(T nδ1(PU,S |s)), where PU,S = PSPU |S , then
P
(
U 6∈ T nδ2(PSPU |STj|s|s, j)|M = m
) ≤ n,
where δ2 and n do not depend8 on (s, j,m) and n → 0 as
n→∞.
Proof: We use Lemma 8 with X → J , Y → S and Z →
U . Further, replace δ0 → δ1 and δ(δ0) → δ2(δ1) here. Next,
the distribution PS,J = PSTj|s and PU = Unif(T nδ1(PU,S |s)).
As U ∼ Unif (T nδ1(PU,S |s)), it follows that both the conditions
of Lemma 8 are satisfied. In particular, the first condition
is met with  = 0 as U ∈ T nδ1(PU,S |s), while the second
condition is met as there exists some g(δ1) > 0, where
g(δ1)→ 0 as δ1 → 0, such that
2n(H(U |S)−g(δ1)) ≤ |T nδ1(PU,S |s)| ≤ 2n(H(U |S)+g(δ1)).
The claim now follows.
The following two claims follow from the conditional
typicality lemma, where the proof of the latter is along the
lines of the one which appears in [30, pg. 27].
Claim 13. Let (u, s, j) ∈ T nδ2(PU,S,J), and let X be generated
from (u, s) through the memoryless distribution 1{X=x(U,S)}.
Then there exists δ3(δ2) > 0, where δ3(δ2) → 0 as δ2 → 0,
such that
P
(
(u, s, j,X) 6∈ T nδ3(PU,S,J1{X=x(U,S)})|M = m
) ≤ n,
where δ3 and n do not depend on (u, s, j,m), and n → 0
as n→∞.
Claim 14. Let (u, s,x, j) ∈ T nδ3(PU,S,X,J), and let Y be
generated from (x, s, j) through the channel WY |X,S,J . Then
there exists δ4(δ3) > 0, where δ4(δ3) → 0 as δ3 → 0, such
that
P
(
(u, s,x, j,Y) 6∈ T nδ4(PU,S,X,JWY |X,S,J)|M = m
) ≤ n,
where δ4 and n do not depend on (u, s, j,x,m), and n → 0
as n→∞.
To proceed with the proof of Lemma 10, let us define the
following error event.
E = {U 6∈ L(Y, γ(δ))}
8The fact that these do not depend on (s, j) is crucial, and it follows
from our Refined Markov Lemma. They also do not depend on m, as the
distribution of U does not depend on m.
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From the definition of the decoder, it follows that this event
E occurs if there does not exist any QJ|S ∈ P(J |S), and
correspondingly any resulting distribution PUY , such that the
chosen U codeword and the received output Y are jointly
typical. In the following, we show that for the specific choice
of QJ|S = TJ|S, the correct codeword U will satisfy the
decoding criterion w.h.p.. Toward this, we define some events:
E1 = {S 6∈ T (n)δ0 (PS)},
E2 = {(S,J) 6∈ T (n)δ0 (PSTJ|S)},
E3 = {(S,U) 6∈ T (n)δ1 (PSPU |S)},
E4 = {(S,J,U) 6∈ T (n)δ2 (PSTJ|SPU |S)},
E5 = {(S,J,U,X) 6∈ T (n)δ3 (PSTJ|SPU |S1{X=x(U,S)})},
E6 = {(S,J,U,X,Y)
6∈ T (n)γ(δ)(PSTJ|SPU |S1{X=x(U,S)}WY |X,S,J)}.
Here δ0(δ) = δ2 and δi, i = 1, 2, 3 and γ will be chosen such
that as functions of δ, they approach 0 as δ → 0. Using the
union bound, we have
P(E|M = m)
≤ P(E1|M = m) + P(E2|Ec1,M = m)
+P(E3|Ec2, Ec1,M = m) + P(E4|Ec3, Ec2, Ec1,M = m)
+P(E5|Ec4, Ec3, Ec2, Ec1,M = m)
+P(E6|Ec5, Ec4, Ec3, Ec2, Ec1,M = m)
(a)
= P(E1|M = m) + P(E3|Ec1,M = m)
+P(E4|Ec3, Ec2,M = m) + P(E5|Ec4, Ec3, Ec2,M = m)
+P(E6|Ec5, Ec4, Ec3, Ec2,M = m). (19)
Here (a) follows from Claim 11. This is because given s ∈
T (n)δ0 (PS) and any j, we have (s, j) ∈ T nδ0(PSTj|s), which
implies E1 = E2, and thus, P(E2|Ec1,M = m) = 0. We now
analyse each of the terms in the RHS of (19).
As S is the output of an i.i.d. source with distribution PS
irrespective of m, it follows that
P(S ∈ T nδ0(PS)|M = m)→ 1
as n→∞. Hence, P(E1|M = m)→ 0 as n→∞.
For the second term, Claim 7 guarantees that there exists
δ1(δ0) > 0, δ1(δ0)→ 0 as δ0 → 0, such that
P
(
(S,U) 6∈ T (n)δ1 (PSPU |S)|S ∈ T
(n)
δ0
(PS),M = m
)
→ 0
as n→∞. We choose δ1 > δ0. Thus,
P(E3|Ec1,M = m) = P(E3|Ec2,M = m)→ 0
as n→∞.
For the third term, let (s, j) ∈ T (n)δ0 (PSTj|s). Then condi-
tioned on (S,J,M) = (s, j,m) as well as conditioned on
Ec3, the distribution of U is Unif
(T nδ1(PU,S |s)). Note that
(s, j) ∈ T (n)δ0 (PSTj|s)⇒ (s, j) ∈ T
(n)
δ1
(PSTj|s) since δ1 > δ0.
We now use Claim 12 which guarantees that there exists
δ2(δ1) > 0, where δ2(δ1)→ 0 as δ1 → 0, such that
P(E4|Ec3, (S,J,M) = (s, j,m)) ≤ n,
where n → 0 as n→∞ (here δ2 as well as n do not depend
on (s, j,m)). Then,
P(E4|Ec3, Ec2,M = m)
=
∑
(s,j)∈T (n)δ0 (PSTj|s)
P(E4|Ec3, (S,J,M) = (s, j,m))
· P((S,J) = (s, j)|M = m)
≤
∑
(s,j)∈T (n)δ0 (PSTj|s)
n P((S,J) = (s, j)|M = m)
≤ n.
Hence, we can conclude that P(E4|Ec3, Ec2,M = m) → 0 as
n→∞.
For the fourth term, let (s, j,u) ∈ T (n)δ2 (PSPU |STj|s).
Now conditioned on (S,J,U,M) = (s, j,u,m), let X be
generated using the memoryless distribution 1{X=x(U,S)}.
Then, Claim 13 guarantees that there exists δ3(δ2) > 0, where
δ3(δ2)→ 0 as δ2 → 0, such that
P(E5|(S,J,U,M) = (s, j,u,m)) ≤ n,
where n → 0 as n → ∞ (here δ3 and n do not depend on
(s, j,u,m)). Let us now define the set
M = {(s, j,u) :(s, j,u) ∈ T (n)δ2 (PSPU |STj|s),
(s,u) ∈ T (n)δ1 (PSPU |S),
(s, j) ∈ T (n)δ0 (PSTj|s)}.
Then,
P(E5|Ec4, Ec3, Ec2,M = m)
=
∑
(s,j,u)∈M
P(E5|(S,J,U,M) = (s, j,u,m))
· P((S,J,U) = (s, j,u)|M = m)
≤
∑
(s,j,u)∈M
n P((S,J,U) = (s, j,u)|M = m)
≤ n.
Hence, it follows that P(E5|Ec4, Ec3, Ec2,M = m) → 0 as
n→∞.
Similarly, for the final term, let
(s, j,u,x) ∈ T (n)δ3 (PSPU |STj|s1{X=x(U,S)}).
Then, conditioned on (S,J,U,X,M) = (s, j,u,x,m), let
Y be generated using the memoryless distribution WY |X,S,J .
From Claim 14, we know that there exists δ4(δ3) > 0, where
δ4(δ3)→ 0 as δ3 → 0, such that
P((S,J,U,X,Y) 6∈ T nδ4(PSPU |STj|s1{X=x(U,S)}
· WY |X,S,J)|(S,J,U,X) = (s, j,u,x)) ≤ n,
where n → 0 as n → ∞ (here δ4 and n do not depend on
(s, j,u,x,m)). We now assume γ(δ) = δ4(δ3(δ2(δ1(δ0(δ)))))
in the definition of E6. Then, by an argument similar to that
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of the fourth term, it follows that
P(E6|Ec5, Ec4, Ec3, Ec2,M = m)→ 0
as n→∞.
As each term in the RHS of (19) is vanishing as n → ∞,
we can conclude that P(E|M = m) → 0 as n → ∞. Thus,
we have shown that, conditioned on M = m, U ∈ L(Y, γ(δ))
with probability approaching 1 as n → ∞. In particular, we
have shown that the correct codeword satisfies the decoding
condition w.r.t. QJ|S = TJ|S. This completes the proof of part
(i) of the lemma.
We prove the second part using some well-known properties
of types [31]–[33]. We begin by introducing some notation
and useful quantities. Let HPU,Y (U |Y ) denote the conditional
entropy of U given Y under the joint distribution PU,Y .
As discussed at the beginning of Section II, to keep the
notation simple, we drop the subscript in PU,Y and denote this
conditional entropy by HP (U |Y ) henceforth. Similarly, the
mutual information between U and Y is denoted as IP (U ;Y ).
Let T denote the set of all types of length-n sequences (u,y).
For any type PU,Y ∈ T , we define
Bδ(PU,Y ) = {τ ∈ T : ‖τ − PU,Y ‖∞ ≤ δ}.
By definition, if Tu,y ∈ Bδ(PU,Y ), then (u,y) ∈ T nδ (PU,Y ).
We know that if (u,y) ∈ T nδ (PU,Y ), then
(α) u ∈ T nδ (PU,Y |y).
(β) there exists g(δ) > 0, where g(δ) → 0 as δ → 0 and
g(δ) does not depend on PU,Y , such that
|T nδ (PU,Y |y)| ≤ 2n(HPU,Y (U |Y )+g(δ)).
Thus, given (u,y) ∈ T nδ (PU,Y ) and for any τ ∈ Bδ(PU,Y ),∣∣{u˜ : Tu˜,y = τ}∣∣ ≤ ∣∣{u˜ : Tu˜,y ∈ Bδ(PU,Y )}∣∣
=
∣∣{u˜ : (u˜,y) ∈ T nδ (PU,Y )}∣∣
(a)
=
∣∣{u˜ : u˜ ∈ T nδ (PU,Y |y)}∣∣
(b)
≤ 2n(HP (U |Y )+g(δ)), (20)
where (a) follows from (α) above while (b) follows from (β).
Let
P
(Q)
U,Y (u, y) =
∑
x,s,j
PS(s)PU |S(u|s)1{X=x(u,s)}
· WY |X,S,JQJ|S(j|s) ∀(u, y),
be the joint distribution for (U, Y ) under the memoryless
strategy QJ|S ∈ P(J |S) of the adversary. Finally, let us
denote
Q∗J|S = arg min
QJ|S∈P(J |S)
IP (Q)(U ;Y ). (21)
Note that the above minimum is achieved, and hence, at least
one exists. If there are more than one minimizers, pick one
arbitrarily from amongst them.
We now get a bound on the size of L(y, γ(δ)).
|L(y, γ(δ))| =
∣∣∣{u : ‖Tu,y − P (Q)U,Y ‖∞ ≤ γ(δ),
for some QJ|S ∈ P(J |S)
}∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
u : Tu,y ∈ ⋃
QJ|S∈P(J |S)
Bγ(δ)
(
P
(Q)
U,Y
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
τ∈⋃QJ|S∈P(J|S) Bγ(δ)(P (Q)U,Y )
{u : Tu,y = τ}
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(a)
≤ (n+ 1)|U||Y|2n(HP (Q∗) (U |Y )+g(δ))
≤ 2n(HP (Q∗) (U |Y )+g˜(δ)), (22)
where g˜(δ) > 0 and g˜(δ) → 0 as δ → 0. Here (a) follows
from noting that there exist at most (n + 1)|U||Y| types of
(u,y) as well as using (20) and (21). Note that |L(y, γ(δ))|
does not depend on y. Hence, we have
P
(
U′ ∈ L(Y, γ(δ))|M = m)
=
|L(Y, γ(δ))|
|T nδ (PU )|
(a)
≤ 2−n(H(U)−f(δ))2n(HP (Q∗) (U |Y )+g˜(δ))
= 2−n(IP (Q∗) (U ;Y )−γ˜(δ)),
where γ˜(δ) = f(δ) + g˜(δ) > 0 and γ˜(δ) → 0 as δ → 0. We
get (a) from noting that
|T nδ (PU )| ≥ 2n(H(U)−f(δ)
for some f(δ) > 0, where f(δ)→ 0 as δ → 0, and from (22).
This completes the proof of the second part, and concludes
the proof of Lemma 10.
B. Proof of Theorem 6: The Dirty Paper AVC Capacity
We first analyse an achievable scheme followed by the
converse. Before we proceed, let us introduce some useful
notation. For any x ∈ Rn, ‖x‖ 6= 0, let xˆ = x/‖x‖ denote
the unit vector in the direction of x. Next, given two vectors
x,y ∈ Rn, 〈x,y〉 ∈ R denotes their dot (inner) product.
1) Achievability: Our code uses the dirty paper coding
scheme, which involves an auxiliary random variable denoted
as U and a fixed parameter α. We choose a rate R < C, where
C is as defined in (5).
Code construction:
• The encoder generates a binned codebook comprising
2nRU = 2n(R+R˜) vectors {Uj,k}, j = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR and
k = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR˜. Here there are 2nR bins which are
indexed by j, where each bin contains 2nR˜ codewords
with k indexing these codewords. R˜ > 0 will be specified
later. For 1 > 0, define P ′ = P − 1. Every codeword
Uj,k is chosen independently and uniformly at random
over the surface of the n-sphere of radius
√
nPU , where
PU = P
′ + α2σ2S ,
α = P ′/(P ′ + Λ + σ2).
The codebook is shared between the encoder and decoder
as the shared randomness Θ.
Encoding:
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• Given a message m and having observed the state S, the
encoder looks within the bin m for some Um,k, k ∈
1, 2, . . . , 2nR˜, such that
| 〈Um,k − αS,S〉 | ≤ nδ1, (23)
for some δ1 > 0 (the choice of δ1 will be discussed later
in Lemma 19). If no such Um,k is found, then the encoder
chooses U1,1. If more than one Um,k satisfying (23)
exists, the encoder chooses one uniformly at random from
amongst them. Let U denote the chosen codeword.
• If ‖U − αS‖ ≤ √nP , then the encoder transmits X =
U−αS over the channel. Otherwise, it transmits the zero
vector.
Decoding:
• We employ the minimum angle decoder. When y is
received at the decoder, its message estimate m˜ is the
solution of the following optimization problem.
m˜ = arg max
1≤j≤2nR
(
max
1≤k≤2nR˜
〈yˆ, uˆj,k〉
)
.
Here the decoder finds the codeword u ∈ C closest in
angle to y.
• If no unique solution exists, the decoder declares an error
by setting m˜ = 0.
Probability of error analysis:
Fix some 1,  > 0, and let
R =
1
2
log
(
1 + P ′/(Λ + σ2)
)− .
Note that R < C and R approaches C as 1, → 0. Next, let
R˜ =
1
2
log(PU/P
′) + /2.
Recall that RU = R+ R˜, and hence, we have
RU =
1
2
log
(
(P ′ + Λ + σ2)PU
(Λ + σ2)P ′
)
− /2. (24)
Before we proceed, here is a brief outline of the analysis.
Given any δ > 0, we establish in Lemma 19 that irrespective of
the adversary’s strategy, the inner product
〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
is at least
(θ − δ) (here θ is given in (26)) w.h.p. for sufficiently large
n. Now regardless of the strategy the adversary employs, a
decoding error occurs only if either
〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
< (θ−δ) or some
other codeword Um′,k′ , for m′ 6= m and k′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR},
satisfies
〈
Yˆ, Uˆm′,k′
〉
≥ (θ−δ). Our aim will be to show that
the probability of this decoding error event goes to zero as
n→∞.
Let us denote the decoding error event by E . Then, we have
E = {M˜ 6= M}. Let M = m be the message sent. Given θ
and for any δ > 0, we then have
P(E|M = m) ≤ P
(〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
< θ − δ
∣∣∣M = m)
+P
(
∃m′, k′ : m′ 6= m,〈
Yˆ, Uˆm′,k′
〉
≥ θ − δ
∣∣∣M = m).
Using (2), it follows that
P (n)e = max
m
max
QJ|m,S:J∈J (Λ)
P(E|M = m).
Hence,
P (n)e ≤ max
m
max
QJ|m,S:J∈J (Λ)
P
(〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
< θ − δ
∣∣∣M = m)
+ max
m
max
QJ|m,S:J∈J (Λ)
P
(
∃m′, k′ : m′ 6= m,〈
Yˆ, Uˆm′,k′
〉
≥ θ − δ
∣∣∣M = m). (25)
We will show that given any 1,  > 0, we can find a δ > 0
such that both the RHS terms above converge to 0 as n→∞.
We now state some important lemmas which are needed to
proceed with the probability of error analysis. We first state a
lemma which directly follows from [34, Lemma 2].
Lemma 15. Consider any rˆ on the unit n-sphere and suppose
an independent random vector Rˆ is uniformly distributed on
this sphere. Then for any γ satisfying 1/
√
2pin < γ < 1, we
have
P{
〈
rˆ, Rˆ
〉
≥ γ} ≤ 2(n−1) 12 log(1−γ2).
The above lemma is used in the proof of the next lemma,
which guarantees encoding success with high probability.
Lemma 16. For any δ1 > 0 and message M = m, the proba-
bility that the encoder finds at least one Um,k satisfying (23)
approaches 1 as n→∞.
The proof of this lemma appears in Appendix B. In the
following lemma, we show that U− αS satisfies the encoder
power constraint, and hence, X = U − αS with high
probability.
Lemma 17. For any δ2 satisfying 0 < δ2 < 1 and message
M = m,
P
(∣∣‖U− αS‖2 − nP ′∣∣ > nδ2|M = m)→ 0,
as n→∞.
Refer Appendix B for the proof of this lemma. The fol-
lowing lemma captures the correlation that an adversary can
induce with the chosen codeword through the choice of its
jamming signal. We use Lemma 15 in the proof of this lemma
as well.
Lemma 18. For any δ3 > 0 and message M=m, under any
jamming strategy QJ|M,S : J ∈ J (Λ),
P
(∣∣∣〈J,U〉 − 〈J, Sˆ〉〈Sˆ,U〉∣∣∣ > nδ3∣∣∣M = m)→ 0,
as n→∞.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. The following is the
main lemma. We use Lemmas 16, 17 and 18 towards proving
it. This lemma shows that given any δ > 0, the inner product〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
is at least (θ − δ) with high probability irrespective
of the adversary’s strategy QJ|M,S : J ∈ J (Λ). Recall that δ1
is the parameter which appears in the definition of the encoder
(see (23)).
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Lemma 19. There is a function δ1 : R+ → R+, where
δ1(δ) → 0 as δ → 0, such that for every message M = m,
under any jamming strategy QJ|M,S : J ∈ J (Λ) and for any
δ > 0, if the parameter δ1 in the definition of the encoder is
chosen as δ1(δ), then
P
(〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
< (θ − δ)
∣∣∣M = m)→ 0,
as n→∞, where
θ =
√
α(P ′ + ασ2S)
PU
. (26)
The proof of this lemma is in Appendix B. Note that θ also
depends on 1. Coming back to the error analysis, note that
Lemma 19 implies that the first RHS term in (25) can be made
arbitrarily small by choosing a sufficiently large n, provided
the encoder parameter δ1 is chosen suitably depending on δ.
Now, the second RHS term in (25) can be bounded using the
union bound, and hence, for any QJ|M,S : J ∈ J (Λ) we have,
P
(
∃m′, k′ : m′ 6= m,
〈
Yˆ, Uˆm′,k′
〉
≥ θ − δ
∣∣∣M = m)
≤
∑
m′ 6=m, k′
P
(〈
Yˆ, Uˆm′,k′
〉
≥ θ − δ
∣∣∣M = m) . (27)
For any m′ 6= m and k′, we have
P
(〈
Yˆ, Uˆm′,k′
〉
≥ θ − δ
∣∣∣M = m)
≤ 2(n−1) 12 log(1−(θ−δ)2), (28)
by Lemma 15, where we replace (rˆ, Rˆ) by (Yˆ, Uˆm′,k′) and
γ by (θ − δ). Using (28) in (27) and noting that the total
number of codewords is 2nRU , we can conclude that for any
QJ|M,S : J ∈ J (Λ)
P
(
∃m′, k′ : m′ 6= m,
〈
Yˆ, Uˆm′,k′
〉
≥ θ − δ
∣∣∣M = m)
≤ 2nRU 2(n−1) 12 log(1−(θ−δ)2). (29)
We now give an alternate expression for RU in terms of θ.
Toward this, consider the following.
1− θ2 (a)= 1− α(P
′ + ασ2S)
PU
=
PU − α2σ2S − αP ′
PU
(b)
=
P ′ − αP ′
PU
=
(1− α)P ′
PU
(c)
=
(Λ + σ2)P ′
(P ′ + Λ + σ2)PU
, (30)
where (26) gives (a), while (b) follows from noting that PU =
P ′+α2σ2S . We get (c) as α = P
′/(P ′+Λ+σ2). Recall from
earlier in (24) our choice of RU . Using (30), we observe that
RU can be also expressed as
RU = −1
2
log
(
1− θ2)− /2.
Now choosing a small enough δ > 0 in (29) such that9
RU < −1
2
log
(
1− (θ − δ)2) , (31)
the RHS in (29), and hence, the second term in the RHS
of (25), approaches 0 as n → ∞. Thus, P (n)e goes to 0 as
n→∞, and this completes the proof of achievability.
2) Converse: We prove the converse for an average proba-
bility of error criterion instead of the maximum probability of
error criterion. For this stronger version of the converse, we
define the average probability of error (similarly as in (6)) by
P (n)e =
1
2nR
2nR∑
m=1
P (n)e,m, (32)
where
P (n)e,m = max
QJ|M=m,S:J∈J (Λ)
P (Φ(Y) 6= m|M = m) . (33)
Now let us consider any sequence of codes with rate R
and P (n)e → 0 as n → ∞. Even though the adversary can
choose an arbitrary feasible vector jamming strategy QJ|M,S :
J∈J (Λ), we analyze the performance of the encoder-decoder
pair under an i.i.d. Gaussian jamming strategy. For an arbi-
trarily small δ > 0, let Λ′ = Λ − δ. We define J′ to be a
vector of length n generated i.i.d. with J ′i ∼ N (0,Λ′), ∀i.
We emphasize that J′ is not a feasible jamming strategy as
‖J′‖ can be greater than √nΛ. We also define a feasible
jamming strategy J whose distribution is the same as the
conditional distribution of J′, conditioned on J′ ∈ J (Λ). Let
 > 0 here. Under the jamming strategy J′, let P ′(n)e be the
average probability of error achieved by the given sequence
of randomized codes. Then,
P ′(n)e
=
1
2nR
2nR∑
i=1
P (Φ(Ψ(i,S) + S+ J′ + Z) 6= i)
≤ 1
2nR
2nR∑
i=1
P
(
Φ(Ψ(i,S) + S+ J′ + Z) 6= i
∣∣∣J′ ∈ J (Λ))
· P (J′ ∈ J (Λ)) + P (‖J′‖2 > nΛ)
(a)
≤ 1
2nR
2nR∑
i=1
P
(
Φ(Ψ(i,S) + S+ J′ + Z) 6= i
∣∣∣J′ ∈ J (Λ))
+ (for large enough n)
=
1
2nR
2nR∑
i=1
P (Φ(Ψ(i,S) + S+ J+ Z) 6= i) + 
(b)
≤ 1
2nR
2nR∑
i=1
P
(n)
e,i + 
(c)
= P (n)e + 
(d)
< 2.
9Note that there exists δ > 0 such that (31) is satisfied. To see this, define
f(δ) = −1/2 log(1−(θ−δ)2). It can be easily verified that f is a continuous
and monotonically decreasing function of δ.
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Here the probability is over the shared randomness, the
channel, the state and adversary’s (i.i.d. Gaussian) action.
As J′ is i.i.d Gaussian with J ′i ∼ N (0,Λ′), ∀i, we have
P(‖J′‖2 > nΛ) → 0 as n → ∞. We choose n large enough
such that P(‖J′‖2 > nΛ) ≤ , which gives (a). Then, (b)
follows from (33) since J is a feasible jamming strategy, while
(c) follows from (32). We now choose n large enough such
that the probability P (n)e is less than , where  > 0. This
gives us (d). Thus, we have shown that for any  > 0, under
i.i.d. Gaussian (variance Λ′) jamming, the given sequence of
randomized encoder-decoder pairs achieve P ′(n)e < 2 for
large enough n.
Under the jamming strategy J′, the resulting channel is a
dirty paper channel with noise variance Λ′ + σ2. Hence, the
rate R must be smaller than the capacity of this channel, i.e.,
C ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
P
Λ′ + σ2
)
.
Since this holds for any Λ′ < Λ, we have
C ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
P
Λ + σ2
)
.
This completes the proof of the converse.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this work, we analysed the performance of a communi-
cation system over a state-dependent channel in the presence
of an adversary. Here both the encoder and the adversary were
state-aware, i.e., they possessed non-causal knowledge of the
state. The adversary induced an AVC through its jamming
interference into the channel, where the interference could be
designed using the non-causal knowledge of the state. We
studied two versions, the discrete memoryless GP-AVC and
the additive white Gaussian DP-AVC, and determined their
randomized coding capacity under a maximum probability
of error criterion. As in other randomized coding setups,
we showed that the capacity for both our AVC setups was
the same under the average probability of error criterion as
well. Owing to the presence of shared randomness, it was
seen that even with the non-causal knowledge of the state
vector and the ability to use vector jamming strategies, the
adversary could impact the communication rate no worse than
by choosing memoryless strategies. Thus, the capacity of both
the AVCs was characterized as that of the worst memoryless
channel with state that the adversary could induce through
some memoryless strategy. Furthermore, in the DP-AVC it was
shown that the adversary, given its purpose, could do no better
than to disregard the state knowledge entirely and introduce
state-independent white Gaussian noise. Both deterministic
coding capacity and the effect of limited shared randomness
are natural next steps to this work. It would be interesting to
know if, like for standard AVCs [31], [35], [36], O(log n)
bits of randomness (in a block length of n) are sufficient
to achieve randomized capacity. Finally, the results presented
in this work could be similarly extended to state-dependent
channels, where, in addition to the encoder and adversary, the
decoder too is state-aware.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
The given distribution PZ is ‘close’ to the uniform distri-
bution over T nδ0(PY,Z |y) due to the properties (a) and (b).
Hence, in a two part proof, we first bound the probability
P (Z 6∈ T nδ (PX,Y,Z |x,y)) for Z ∼ Unif(T nδ0(PY,Z |y)). Then,
in the second part, we appropriately modify this bound to
obtain a bound on P (Z 6∈ T nδ (PX,Y,Z |x,y)) under the given
distribution PZ.
To prove the first part, we begin by assuming that Z ∼
Unif(T nδ0(PY,Z |y)). Then, as given on the next page, we can
simplify P(Z 6∈ T nδ (PX,Y,Z |x,y)) to (36), where (34) follows
from the union bound, and (35) follows by relaxing the strict
inequality. Since Z ∈ T nδ0(PY,Z |y) (with probability one), we
have ∀(y, z) ∈ Y × Z∣∣∣∣N(y, z|y,Z)n − PY (y)PZ|Y (z|y)
∣∣∣∣ < δ0. (37)
For every (y, z) such that PZ|Y (z|y) = 0, N(y, z|y,Z) ≤
nδ0 using (37). This further implies that N(x, y, z|x,y,Z) ≤
nδ0. By choosing δ large enough such that δ > δ0, we can
guarantee that N(x, y, z|x,y,Z) < nδ, and hence, it follows
that the probability of both the terms in the summation in (36)
is zero.
For other values of (y, z), for which PZ|Y (z|y) > 0, we
first note that PZ|Y (z|y) ≥ PminZ|Y , where
PminZ|Y := min
(y,z):PZ|Y (z|y)>0
PZ|Y (z|y).
We define δ′′0 = δ0 +
√
δ0 < 2
√
δ0, and we assume that δ >
3
√
δ0. If PY (y) < δ′′0 , then PY,Z(y, z) < δ
′′
0 . This implies that
N(y, z|y,Z) ≤ n(δ′′0 + δ0)
< n(3
√
δ0)
< nδ.
This again implies that
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z) ≤ nδ,
and thus, the probability of the first term in (36) is zero.
Further, if PY (y) < δ′′0 , then
PY (y)PX|Y (x|y)PZ|Y (z|y) ≤ δ′′0 .
This implies that
−δ + PY (y)PX|Y (x|y)PZ|Y (z|y) < 0,
and hence, the probability of the second term in (36) is zero.
We have, thus, shown that the probability terms in both the
summations in the RHS of (36) are equal to zero. Based on
the above observations, we now consider those (y, z) ∈ Y×Z
such that PZ|Y (z|y) ≥ PminZ|Y and PY (y) ≥ δ′′0 .
We know that (x,y) ∈ T nδ0(PX,Y ). Hence,∣∣∣∣N(x, y|x,y)n − PX,Y (x, y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ0 ∀(x, y). (38)
We now make the following claim.
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P(Z 6∈ T nδ (PX,Y,Z |x,y)) = P
( ⋃
(x,y,z)
{∣∣∣∣∣N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)n − PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y)
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
})
≤
∑
x,y,z
P
(∣∣∣∣∣N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)n − PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y)
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
)
(34)
≤
∑
x,y,z
P
(∣∣∣∣∣N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)n − PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ
)
(35)
=
∑
x,y,z
P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
n
≥ PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y) + δ
)
+
∑
x,y,z
P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
n
≤ PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y)− δ
)
(36)
Claim 20. If z ∈ T nδ0(PY,Z |y), then∣∣∣∣N(y, z|y, z)N(y|y) − PZ|Y (z|y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ′0 ∀(y, z), (39)
where δ′0(δ0) = 2
√
δ0.
Proof: Since (y, z) ∈ T nδ0(PY,Z), we have ∀(y, z),
N(y, z|y, z)
n
− PY,Z(y, z) ≤ δ0.
As PY (y) ≥ δ′′0 and from (38), it follows that N(y|y)/n > 0.
Thus,
N(y, z|y, z)
N(y|y) ≤
PY,Z(y, z) + δ0
N(y|y)
n
.
But, we know that∣∣∣∣N(y|y)n − PY (y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ0 ∀y.
Hence, it follows that
N(y, z|y, z)
N(y|y) − PZ|Y (z|y) ≤
PY,Z(y, z) + δ0
PY (y)− δ0 − PZ|Y (z|y)
=
δ0(1 + PZ|Y (z|y))
PY (y)− δ0
≤ 2δ0
PY (y)− δ0
(a)
≤ 2δ0
δ′′0 − δ0
(b)
= 2
√
δ0.
Here (a) follows from PY (y) ≥ δ′′0 , and (b) is true as δ′′0 =
δ0 +
√
δ0. Similarly, it can be shown that
N(y, z|y, z)
N(y|y) − PZ|Y (z|y) ≥ −2
√
δ0.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Continuing the analysis further, we consider a term inside
the first sum in (36). We first recall that if N(x, y|x,y) < nδ,
then N(x, y, z|x,y,Z) < nδ, and thus, the probability under
consideration is zero. Hence, in the following, we assume
w.l.o.g. that N(x, y|x,y) ≥ nδ. We now get (42), as given
on top of the next page, where
t1 = P
min
Z|Y
((
δ − δ0
1 + δ0
)
− δ
′
0
PminZ|Y
)
,
and does not depend on n. We choose δ such that t1 > 0.
Recall that we have earlier required δ > 3
√
δ0 already.
Note that (40) (given on the next page) follows from the
upper bound for N(x, y|x,y)/n in (38), while (41) (given
on the next page) follows as ∀(y, z) under consideration,
PZ|Y (z|y) ≥ PminZ|Y . The following claim now gives an
exponentially decaying bound on the term appearing in (42).
Claim 21. If N(x, y|x,y) ≥ nδ and t1 > 0,
P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) − (PZ|Y (z|y) + δ
′
0) ≥ t1
)
≤ e−2nδt21 .
Proof: Let S(x, y|x,y) denote the indices of (x,y) with
the value (x, y) and S(y|y) denote the indices of y with the
value y. We now consider a different but equivalent random
experiment for generating Z. First Z˜ is chosen uniformly
at random from T nδ0(PY,Z |y), where PY,Z = PY PZ|Y , and
then, for each y, its components at S(y|y) are subjected
to a permutation chosen uniformly at random from the set
of all permutations of S(y|y). Since the set of sequences
in T nδ0(PY,Z |y) are invariant under such permutations, this
two-step process results in the same final distribution of Z˜,
i.e., uniform over T nδ0(PY,Z |y). From (39), N(y, z|y, Z˜) is
bounded by
N(y, z|y, Z˜) ≤ N(y|y)(PZ|Y (z|y) + δ′0). (43)
For a given S(y|y) and conditioned on N(y, z|y, Z˜) = k, the
number N(x, y, z|x,y, Z˜) can be considered as the number
of positions in S(x, y|x,y) at which the letter z is assigned
by the random permutation in the components in S(y|y).
Thus, N(x, y, z|x,y, Z˜) is the number of times z is obtained
when a total of |S(x, y|x,y)| = N(x, y|x,y) samples are
drawn without replacement from a collection of |S(y|y)|
components, of which k components have value z. Now using
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P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
n
≥ δ +PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y)
)
= P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y)
N(x, y|x,y)
n
≥ δ + PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y)
)
≤ P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) ≥
(δ + PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y))
(δ0 + PX,Y (x, y))
)
(40)
= P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) ≥
PZ|Y (z|y)
PZ|Y (z|y)
(δ + PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y))
(δ0 + PX,Y (x, y))
)
≤ P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) ≥ PZ|Y (z|y)
(δ + PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y))
(δ0 + PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y))
)
≤ P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) ≥ PZ|Y (z|y)
(
δ + 1
δ0 + 1
))
= P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) ≥ PZ|Y (z|y)
(
1 +
δ − δ0
1 + δ0
))
= P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) − (PZ|Y (z|y) + δ
′
0) ≥ PZ|Y (z|y)
(
δ − δ0
1 + δ0
)
− δ′0
)
≤ P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) − (PZ|Y (z|y) + δ
′
0) ≥ PminZ|Y (z|y)
(
δ − δ0
1 + δ0
)
− δ′0
)
(41)
= P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) − (PZ|Y (z|y) + δ
′
0) ≥ t1
)
, (42)
Hoeffding’s inequality for sampling without replacement [37],
P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y, Z˜)
|S(x, y|x,y)| −
k
|S(y|y)| > t1
∣∣∣N(y, z|y, Z˜) = k)
≤ e−2|S(x,y|x,y)|t21
⇒P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y, Z˜)
N(x, y|x,y) −
N(y, z|y, Z˜)
N(y|y) > t1)
)
≤ e−2N(x,y|x,y)t21
⇒P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y, Z˜)
N(x, y|x,y) − (PZ|Y (z|y) + δ
′
0) ≥ t1
)
≤ e−2nδt21 ,
where the last step follows from (43) and N(x, y|x,y) ≥ nδ.
This completes the proof of Claim 21.
We will now get a similar bound for each term inside the
second sum in (36). Recall that (y, z) ∈ Y × Z such that
PY (y) > δ
′′
0
= δ0 +
√
δ0
and PZ|Y (z|y) ≥ PminZ|Y . Note that if N(x, y|x,y) ≤ (1/4)nδ,
then from (38),
PX,Y (x, y) ≤ N(x, y|x,y)/n+ δ0
≤ δ/4 + δ0.
Hence,
PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y) ≤ δ
4
+ δ0.
Then, the probability under consideration is zero if δ0 < 3δ/4.
Hence, for the rest of the analysis we assume that
N(x, y|x,y) ≥ (1/4)nδ.
Note that this implies
PX,Y (x, y)− δ0
(a)
≥
(
N(x, y|x,y)
n
− δ0
)
− δ0
≥ δ
4
− 2δ0
(b)
> 0. (44)
Here, (a) follows from (38), and (b) follows by choosing δ >
8δ0. We now get (47), given on top of the next page, where
t2 = P
min
Z|Y
((
δ − δ0
1− δ0
)
− δ
′
0
PminZ|Y
)
and does not depend on n. Once again, we choose δ so as to
ensure that t2 > 0. Observe that (45) (given on the next page)
follows from the lower bound for N(x, y|x,y)/n in (38) as
well as by choosing δ > 8δ0 so that (44) is true. We get (46)
(given on the next page) as we are analyzing for (y, z) for
which PZ|Y (z|y) ≥ PminZ|Y .
Claim 22. If N(x, y|x,y) ≥ (1/4) nδ and t2 > 0
P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) − (PZ|Y (z|y)− δ
′
0) ≤ −t2
)
≤ e−n2 δt22 .
Proof: The proof follows in a manner similar to that of
Claim 21.
Now summing over all possible (x, y, z) in (36) and using
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P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
n
≤− δ+PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y)
)
= P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y)
N(x, y|x,y)
n
≤ −δ + PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y)
)
(a)
≤ P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) ≤
(−δ + PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y))
(−δ0 + PX,Y (x, y))
)
(45)
= P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) ≤
PZ|Y (z|y)
PZ|Y (z|y)
(−δ + PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y))
(−δ0 + PX,Y (x, y))
)
≤ P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) ≤ PZ|Y (z|y)
(−δ + PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y))
(−δ0 + PX,Y (x, y)PZ|Y (z|y))
)
≤ P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) ≤ PZ|Y (z|y)
(−δ + 1)
(−δ0 + 1)
)
= P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) ≤ PZ|Y (z|y)
(
1− δ − δ0
1− δ0
))
= P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) − PZ|Y (z|y) + δ
′
0 ≤ −PZ|Y (z|y)
(
δ − δ0
1− δ0
)
+ δ′0
)
(b)
≤ P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) − (PZ|Y (z|y)− δ
′
0) ≤ −PminZ|Y
((
δ − δ0
1− δ0
)
− δ
′
0
PminZ|Y
))
(46)
= P
(
N(x, y, z|x,y,Z)
N(x, y|x,y) − (PZ|Y (z|y)− δ
′
0) ≤ −t2
)
, (47)
Claims 21 and 22, we have
P (Z 6∈ T nδ (PX,Y,Z |x,y)) ≤ |X ||Y||Z|
(
e−2nδt
2
1 + e−
n
2 δt
2
2
)
≤ 2 |X ||Y||Z| e−n2 δt2 , (48)
where t = min(2t1, t2). This shows that when Z is chosen
uniformly over T nδ0(PY,Z |y), the result holds. This completes
the first part of the proof.
For the second part, we will now perturb the uniform
distribution to an arbitrary distribution PZ satisfying the con-
ditions of the lemma. Under PZ(z), some non-zero probability
(denoted by ) may be assigned to the set of non-typical
sequences, i.e., the complement of the set T nδ0(PY,Z |y). Due
to the perturbation, the probability of a typical sequence in
T nδ0(PY,Z |y) can also increase by a factor of at most 2nh(δ0),
where h(δ0)→ 0 as δ0 → 0. Specifically, we know that∣∣T nδ0(PY,Z |y)∣∣ ≤ 2n(H(Z|Y )+g˜(δ0)),
where g˜(δ0) = (maxyH(Z|Y = y)) · δ0, and g˜(δ) → 0 as
δ0 → 0. Note that g˜(δ0) depends only on PZ|Y . Hence, under
the uniform distribution over T nδ0(PY,Z |y),
P(Z = z) ≥ 2−n(H(Z|Y )+g˜(δ0)).
By condition (b) of the Lemma, the perturbation in the dis-
tribution can increase the probability of any typical sequence
by a factor of at most
2−n(H(Z|Y )−g(δ0))/2−n(H(Z|Y )+g˜(δ0)) = 2nh(δ0).
Here h(δ0) > 0 and h(δ0)→ 0 as δ0 → 0.
Thus, the probability P (Z 6∈ T nδ (PX,Y,Z |x,y)) can now be
bounded as follows. Given x and y, let us define the set
E = {z : (x,y, z) 6∈ T nδ (PX,Y,Z)} = E1 ∪ E2,
where E1 = E ∩ T nδ0(PY,Z |y) and E2 = E\E1. Then, using
the union bound and (48), we have
P(E) ≤ P(E1) + P(E2)
≤
(
2 |X ||Y||Z| e−n2 δt2
)
2nh(δ0) + 
= 2 |X ||Y||Z| e−n( 12 δt2−h(δ0) ln 2) + .
We now choose a δ(δ0) large enough such that K = 12δt
2 −
h(δ0) ln 2 > 0 as well as all the other conditions on δ
appearing in the proof are met. This completes the proof of
Lemma 8.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF LEMMAS 16, 17, 18 AND 19
A. Proof of Lemma 16
Let M = m be the message and define the event (as a
function of δ1 > 0)
E0 =
{∣∣‖S‖2 − nσ2S∣∣ > nδ0(δ1)} , (49)
where 0 < δ0(δ1) < δ1 (the exact choice of δ0(δ1) will be
discussed later in Claim 24), and δ0(δ1) → 0 as δ1 → 0. As
S is an i.i.d. Gaussian vector, where Si ∼ N (0, σ2S), ∀i, it
follows that P(E0) → 0 as n → ∞ for given δ0 > 0. Next,
let us define
β := α
√
σ2S
PU
. (50)
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Note that β also depends on 1 through the definition of PU .
We observe that
R˜ >
1
2
log
(
PU
P ′
)
=
1
2
log
(
1
1− β2
)
, (51)
as PU = P ′ + α2σ2S and by noting that 1 − β2 = P ′/PU
from (50). Our aim is to show that for any δ1 > 0,
P(@k : | 〈Um,k − αS,S〉 | ≤ nδ1)→ 0,
as n→∞. Note that
P(@k : | 〈Um,k − αS,S〉 | ≤ nδ1)
≤ P(E0)
+
∫
s∈Ec0
P(@k : | 〈Um,k − αs, s〉 | ≤ nδ1|S = s)dFS(s), (52)
where FS(·) is the probability distribution function of S.
Recall from earlier that P(E0) → 0 as n → ∞. We now
analyse the second term in the RHS of (52). Toward this, let
us consider the following for any s satisfying |‖s‖2−nσ2S | ≤
nδ0(δ1) (i.e., s ∈ Ec0). Then,
P( @k : | 〈Um,k − αs, s〉 | ≤ nδ1|S = s)
= P(| 〈Um,k − αs, s〉 | > nδ1,∀k)
(a)
=
2nR˜∏
k=1
P(| 〈Um,k − αs, s〉 | > nδ1)
= (P(| 〈Um,1 − αs, s〉 | > nδ1))2
nR˜
= (P({〈Um,1 − αs, s〉 < −nδ1}
∪{〈Um,1 − αs, s〉 > nδ1}))2nR˜
(b)
≤ (P(〈Um,1 − αs, s〉 < −nδ1)
+P(〈Um,1 − αs, s〉 ≥ nδ1))2nR˜
= (P(〈Um,1, s〉 < α‖s‖2 − nδ1)
+P(〈Um,1, s〉 ≥ α‖s‖2 + nδ1))2nR˜
= (
(
1− P (〈Um,1, s〉 ≥ α‖s‖2 − nδ1))
+P
(〈Um,1, s〉 ≥ α‖s‖2 + nδ1))2nR˜ (53)
Here (a) follows as Um,k, ∀k, are independently chosen, while
(b) follows from the use of the union bound as well as relaxing
the inequality in the second term.
To proceed, we require some additional results. We first
state a lemma and then make a useful claim.
Lemma 23. Suppose Rˆ is chosen uniformly at random on
the unit sphere surface. Then, for any unit vector rˆ and any
γ satisfying 0 < γ < 1, we have
P
(〈
rˆ, Rˆ
〉
≥ γ
)
≥ 2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−γ2 +f(n)
)
,
where
f(n) =
1
2n
log
(
2pinγ2(1− γ2)
(
nγ2
nγ2 − (1− γ2)
)2)
.
There exists n0(γ) such that f(n) ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ n0(γ), and
limn→∞ f(n) = 0.
Proof: The result directly follows from [38, eqn. (27)].
To see this, let ∠(rˆ, Rˆ) denote the angle between the vectors
rˆ and Rˆ. Then, from [38, eqn. (27)], we know that
P
(
∠(rˆ, Rˆ) ≤ θ
)
≥
(
1− 1
n
tan2 θ
)
1√
2pin
sinn−1 θ
cos θ
.
Let us make the substitution γ = cos θ in the above equation.
Then,
P
(〈
rˆ, Rˆ
〉
≥ γ
)
≥
(
1− 1
n
1− γ2
γ2
)
1√
2pin
√
(1− γ2)n−1
γ2
= 2
log
((
1− 1n 1−γ
2
γ2
)
1√
2pin
√
(1−γ2)n−1
γ2
)
= 2
−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−γ2 +
1
2n log
(
2pinγ2(1−γ2)
(
nγ2
nγ2−(1−γ2)
)2))
.
Thus, we have shown that
P
(〈
rˆ, Rˆ
〉
≥ γ
)
≥ 2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−γ2 +f(n)
)
,
where f(n) is as given in the lemma. It is easily verified
from the expression for f(n) that there exists n0(γ) such
that f(n) ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ n0(γ). This completes the proof of
the lemma.
We now make the following claim. The previous lemma is
used in the proof of this claim.
Claim 24. There exists δ0(δ1), where δ0(δ1) → 0 as δ1 → 0
for E0 as in (49). Further, there exists δ˜1(δ1) > 0, where
δ˜1(δ1)→ 0 as δ1 → 0, such that for any s ∈ Ec0,
(i) there exists n0, such that f1(n) ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ n0 and
limn→∞ f1(n) = 0, such that
P(〈Um,1, s〉 ≥ α‖s‖2 − nδ1)
≥ 2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+f1(n)
)
,
(ii) we have
P(〈Um,1, s〉 ≥ α‖s‖2 + nδ1) ≤ 2−
(n−1)
2
(
log 1
1−(β+δ˜1)2
)
.
Proof: Consider any s satisfying |‖s‖2−nσ2S | ≤ nδ0(δ1)
(where δ0(δ1) is to be specified). We begin with the proof of
part (i).
P( 〈Um,1, s〉 ≥ α‖s‖2 − nδ1)
= P
(〈
Um,1
‖Um,1‖ ,
s
‖s‖
〉
≥ α‖s‖‖Um,1‖ −
nδ1
‖s‖‖Um,1‖
)
(a)
= P
(〈
Uˆm,1, sˆ
〉
≥ α‖s‖√
nPU
− nδ1‖s‖√nPU
)
(b)
≥ P
(〈
Uˆm,1, sˆ
〉
≥ α
√
n(σ2S + δ0)√
nPU
− nδ1√
n(σ2S + δ0)
√
nPU
)
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(c)
≥ P
〈Uˆm,1, sˆ〉 ≥ α
√
σ2S
PU
+ α
√
δ0
PU
− δ1√
PU (σ2S + δ0)

= P
(〈
Uˆm,1, sˆ
〉
≥ α
√
σ2S
PU
−
(
δ1√
PU (σ2S + δ0)
− α
√
δ0
PU
))
(d)
= P
〈Uˆm,1, sˆ〉 ≥ α
√
σ2S
PU
− δ˜1

(e)
= P
(〈
Uˆm,1, sˆ
〉
≥ β − δ˜1
)
(f)
≥ 2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+f1(n)
)
.
We get (a) since ‖Um,1‖ =
√
nPU , while (b) follows as
|‖s‖2 − nσ2S | ≤ nδ0, ∀s ∈ Ec0. As
√
σ2S + δ0 <
√
σ2S +
√
δ0
for δ0 > 0, we get (c). Defining
δ˜1 =
(
δ1√
PU (σ2S + δ0)
− α
√
δ0
PU
)
gives us (d). Here we choose δ0 (as a function of δ1) small
enough such that
√
δ0(σ2S + δ0) < δ1. As α ≤ 1, this implies
that δ˜1 > 0. We get (e) from (50), while (f) follows by using
Lemma 23 with γ = (β − δ˜1). Here it is easily verified using
Lemma 23 that f1(n) is such that ∃n0 such that f1(n) ≥ 0,
n ≥ n0 and limn→∞ f1(n) = 0. This completes the proof of
part (i).
The proof of part (ii) proceeds along similar lines.
P( 〈Um,1, s〉 ≥ α‖s‖2 + nδ1)
(a)
≤ P
(〈
Uˆm,1, sˆ
〉
≥ α
√
n(σ2S − δ0)√
nPU
+
nδ1√
n(σ2S + δ0)
√
nPU
)
(b)
≤ P
(〈
Uˆm,1, sˆ
〉
≥ α
√
σ2S
PU
− α
√
δ0
PU
+
δ1√
PU (σ2S + δ0)
)
(c)
= P
(〈
Uˆm,1, sˆ
〉
≥ β + δ˜1
)
(d)
≤ 2−(n−1)
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β+δ˜1)2
)
As ‖Um,1‖ =
√
nPU and |‖s‖2 − nσ2S | ≤ nδ0, ∀s ∈ Ec0,
we get (a). We get (b) since
√
σ2S − δ0 >
√
σ2S −
√
δ0 for
0 < δ0 < σ
2
S , where the latter is trivially true. Recall that
δ˜1 =
(
δ1√
PU (σ2S + δ0)
− α
√
δ0
PU
)
,
where δ˜1 > 0 given our choice of δ0. Using this and (50),
we get (c). Finally, Lemma 15 with γ = β + δ˜1 gives us (d).
This completes the proof of part (ii), and hence, establishes
the claim.
Coming back to the proof, it follows from (53) and Claim 24
that for any s such that |‖s‖2 − nσ2S | ≤ nδ0,
P(@k : | 〈Um,k − αs, s〉 | ≤ nδ1|S = s)
≤
((
1− 2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+f1(n)
))
+2
−(n−1)
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β+δ˜1)2
))2nR˜
. (54)
Note that the upper bound does not depend on s. We use this
fact to now simplify the RHS of (52) as follows.∫
s∈Ec0
P(@k : | 〈Um,k − αs, s〉 | ≤ nδ1|S = s) dFS(s)
(a)
≤
[(
1− 2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+f1(n)
))
+2
−(n−1)
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β+δ˜1)2
)]2nR˜
· P(Ec0)
≤
[
1− 2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+f1(n)
)
+2
−(n−1)
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β+δ˜1)2
)]2nR˜
=
[
1− 2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+f1(n)
)
·
(
1− 2−n
(
1
2 log
1−(β−δ˜1)2
1−(β+δ˜1)2
−f1(n)− 12n log 11−(β+δ˜1)2
))]2nR˜
(b)
=
[
1− 2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+f1(n)
) (
1− 2−nc(n)
)]2nR˜
(c)
≤
[
1− 2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+η
) (
1− 2−nc(n)
)]2nR˜
(d)
=
[
1− µ(n)2−n
(
1
2 log
1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+η
)]2nR˜
(e)
≤ e
−2nR˜
[
µ(n)2
−n
(
1
2
log 1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+η
)]
= e−µ(n)2
n
(
R˜−
(
1
2
log 1
1−(β−δ˜1)2
+η
))
. (55)
Here (54) gives (a), and we get (b) by defining
c(n) :=
1
2
log
1− (β − δ˜1)2
1− (β + δ˜1)2
− f1(n)
− 1
2n
log
1
1− (β + δ˜1)2
.
We get (c) as follows. We choose n large enough such that
the exponent c(n) > 0 as well as 0 ≤ f1(n) ≤ η, for some
η > 0. The fact that such a choice of n exists follows from
part (i) of Claim 24 and since
log
1− (β − δ˜1)2
1− (β + δ˜1)2
> 0.
We discuss the choice of η later, but note that we can choose
any η > 0. This gives us (c). Next, we define µ(n) := 1 −
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2−nc(n) to get (d). We know that for any x ∈ [0, 1] and any
k ≥ 0, (1 − x)k ≤ e−kx. Now (e) follows from noting that
0 < µ(n) < 1, ∀n, implies 0 ≤ µ(n) ·2−nl ≤ 1, for any l ≥ 0.
Thus, given δ1 > 0 (and hence, δ˜1(δ1) > 0) and from (51),
it follows that we can choose an η > 0 small enough such
that
R˜ >
(
1
2
log
1
1− (β − δ˜1)2
+ η
)
.
This guarantees that the RHS in (55) goes to zero as n→∞.
Using (55) in (52), it then follows that
P(@k : | 〈Um,k − αS,S〉 | ≤ nδ1)→ 0,
as n→∞. This concludes the proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 17
Given the message M = m, let us define the following
events.
E0 =
{∣∣‖S‖2 − nσ2S∣∣ > nδ0}
E1 = {@ k : |〈Um,k − αS,S〉| ≤ nδ1} .
Here δ0, δ1 > 0 depend on δ2, and will be chosen such that
they approach 0 as δ2 → 0. Their choice will be specified
later. Further, recall the proof of Lemma 16, where δ0 is a
function of δ1. We use the same δ0 function here, and hence,
only need to specify δ1. As S is an i.i.d. Gaussian vector,
where Si ∼ N (0, σ2S), ∀i, P(E0|M = m) → 0 as n → ∞
for δ0 > 0. From Lemma 16, it follows that for δ1 > 0,
P(E1|M = m) → 0 as n → ∞. Let U denote the codeword
chosen.
Let us define E = E0∪E1. Conditioning on Ec and noting
that U is chosen over the n-sphere with radius
√
nPU , we
have
‖U− αS‖2 = ‖U‖2 + α2‖S‖2 − 2α 〈U,S〉
(a)
≥ ‖U‖2 + α2‖S‖2 − 2α(α‖S‖2 + nδ1)
= ‖U‖2 − α2‖S‖2 − n(2αδ1)
≥ nPU − nα2(σ2S + δ0)− n(2αδ1)
= n(PU − α2σ2S)− n(α2δ0 + 2αδ1)
(b)
= nP ′ − nδ˜,
where δ˜ = (α2δ0 + 2αδ1), and δ˜ → 0 as δ0, δ1 → 0. Here (a)
follows from Lemma 16 as conditioned on Ec1, we have
α‖S‖2 − nδ1 ≤ 〈U,S〉 ≤ α‖S‖2 + nδ1.
We get (b) from noting that P ′ = PU − α2σ2S . Similarly, it
can be shown that
‖U− αS‖2 ≤ n(P ′ + δ˜).
We now ensure that δ0 and δ1 are chosen small enough such
that
δ0 + 2δ1 < δ2. (56)
As α ≤ 1, this implies that δ˜ < δ2. Hence,
P
(∣∣‖U− αS‖2 − nP ′∣∣ > nδ2|M = m) ≤ P(E|M = m)
→ 0
as n→∞. This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 18
Let M = m be the message and let U denote the chosen
codeword. We resolve the components of J and U along
directions parallel and orthogonal to S. We denote the latter
components as J⊥ and U⊥ respectively.
J =
〈
J, Sˆ
〉
Sˆ+ J⊥
U =
〈
U, Sˆ
〉
Sˆ+U⊥.
Note that
〈
J⊥, Sˆ
〉
= 0 =
〈
U⊥, Sˆ
〉
, and thus,
〈J,U〉 =
〈
J, Sˆ
〉〈
Sˆ,U
〉
+
〈
J⊥,U⊥
〉
.
To prove this lemma, we need to show that for any δ3 > 0,
P
(|〈J⊥,U⊥〉| > nδ3|M = m)→ 0
as n → ∞, i.e., J⊥ and U⊥ are nearly orthogonal for large
enough n.
To proceed, we introduce some notation. Let
Sn (0, r) = {w ∈ Rn : ‖w‖ = r}
be the surface of an n-sphere centered at the origin and with
radius r. For any w ∈ Rn, let C⊥(w) denote the (n − 1)
subspace orthogonal to w. We now make the following claim.
Claim 25. Conditioned on M = m, S = s and 〈U,S〉 = z,
the random vector U is uniformly distributed over
Bz(s) =
{
z
s
‖s‖2 + v : v ∈ S
n (0, ρz(s))
⋂
C⊥ (s)
}
, (57)
where
ρz(s) =
√
nPU − z
2
‖s‖2 . (58)
Proof: Given the symmetry of the codebook generation
and the encoding, we know that the chosen codeword vector
U is uniformly distributed over the set Sn(0,√nPU ). Now
conditioned on message M = m, state S = s and 〈U,S〉 = z,
it follows that the codeword vector U is uniformly distributed
over the set
B˜z(s) =
{
u : ‖u‖ =
√
nPU and 〈u, s〉 = z
}
. (59)
To proceed further, we show that Bz(s) = B˜z(s). The claim
then follows from observing that U is uniformly distributed
over the set B˜z(s).
i) To show u ∈ B˜z(s)⇒ u ∈ Bz(s).
Let u ∈ B˜z(s). Expressing u through its two components,
one in the direction parallel to s and the other orthogonal
to it, we get
u = 〈u, s〉 s‖s‖2 + u
⊥.
Note here that
〈
u⊥, s
〉
= 0 and
‖u⊥‖ =
√
nPU − z
2
‖s‖2 .
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Comparison with (57) completes the proof for the forward
part.
ii) To show u ∈ Bz(s)⇒ u ∈ B˜z(s).
Consider some vector u ∈ Bz(s). Using (59), we can
write
u = z
s
‖s‖2 + v,
where
v ∈ Sn(0, ρz(s))
⋂
C⊥ (s)
and ρz(s) is as given in (58). It can be easily verified
that ‖u‖ = √nPU . Also, 〈v, s〉 = 0, and hence, it can be
immediately seen that 〈u, s〉 = z. Thus, u ∈ B˜z(s).
This completes the proof of the claim.
The following claim, which is equivalent to the lemma as
discussed earlier, completes the proof.
Claim 26. For any δ3 > 0,
P
(∣∣〈J⊥,U⊥〉∣∣ > nδ3∣∣∣M = m)→ 0,
as n→∞.
Proof: We first prove the conditional version of this claim,
where we condition on state S = s and 〈U, s〉 = z. From
Claim 25, we know that
U = z
s
‖s‖2 +V,
where
V ∼ Unif
(
Sn(0,
√
ρz(s))
⋂
C⊥ (s)
)
with ρz(s) as given in (58). Now for δ3 > 0, we have
P
(∣∣〈J⊥,U⊥〉∣∣
n
> δ3
∣∣∣∣M = m,S = s, 〈U, s〉 = z)
=P
(
1
n
∣∣∣∣〈 J⊥‖J⊥‖ , V‖V‖
〉∣∣∣∣ > δ3‖J⊥‖‖V‖
∣∣∣∣m, s, z)
(a)
≤ P
(
1
n
∣∣∣〈Jˆ⊥, Vˆ〉∣∣∣ > δ3√
nΛ
√
nPU
∣∣∣∣m, s, z)
= P
(∣∣∣〈Jˆ⊥, Vˆ〉∣∣∣ > δ3√
ΛPU
∣∣∣∣m, s, z) .
Here (a) follows from noting that ‖J⊥‖ ≤ ‖J‖ ≤ √nΛ and
‖V‖ ≤ √nPU .
Since the shared randomness Θ is unavailable to the adver-
sary, conditioned on M = m, S = s and Z = z, it follows
that J⊥ and V are independent. Also, both J⊥ and V lie in
the (n−1) hyperplane orthogonal to s. Now using Lemma 15
with δ˜3 = δ3/
√
ΛPU > 0, we have
P
(∣∣∣〈Jˆ⊥, Vˆ〉∣∣∣ > δ˜3∣∣∣m, s, z)
≤ 2
(
2(n−1)
1
2 log(1−δ˜23)
)
∀m, s, z,
= 2
(
2−(n−1)f(δ˜3)
)
∀m, s, z, (60)
where
f(δ˜3) =
1
2
log
(
1
1− δ˜23
)
=
1
2
log
(
PUΛ
PUΛ− δ23
)
> 0.
Since the upper bound in (60) tends to zero as n → ∞, the
conditional version of the claim follows. However, note that
the bound in (60) does not depend on m, s or z. Hence, the
unconditioned version is also true, and the claim follows.
D. Proof of Lemma 19
Let M = m be the message and let U denote the chosen
codeword. We know that
〈Y,U〉=〈U+ (1− α)S+ J+ Z,U〉
=‖U‖2 + (1− α) 〈S,U〉+ 〈J,U〉+ 〈Z,U〉 (61)
and
‖Y‖2 = 〈U+ (1− α)S+ J+ Z,U+ (1− α)S+ J+ Z〉
= ‖U‖2 + (1− α)2‖S‖2 + ‖J‖2 + ‖Z‖2
+2(〈U,Z〉+ 〈J,Z〉+ 〈J,U〉)
+2((1− α) (〈U,S〉+ 〈J,S〉+ 〈S,Z〉)). (62)
Let us define the following events:
E0 =
{∣∣‖S‖2 − nσ2S∣∣ > nδ0} ,
E1 = {@ k : |〈Um,k − αS,S〉| ≤ nδ1} ,
E2 =
{∣∣‖U− αS‖2 − nP ′∣∣ > nδ2} ,
E3 =
{∣∣∣〈J,U〉 − 〈J, Sˆ〉〈Sˆ,U〉∣∣∣ > nδ3} ,
E4 = {|〈U,Z〉| > nδ4} ,
E5 = {|〈S,Z〉| > nδ5} ,
E6 = {|〈J,Z〉| > nδ6} ,
E7 =
{∣∣‖Z‖2 − nσ2∣∣ > nδ7} .
Here δi > 0, i = 0, 1, . . . , 7 depend on δ, where δi, ∀i, are
such that they approach 0 as δ → 0. The choice of δi, i =
0, 1, . . . , 7, will be specified later. Recall from the proof of
Lemma 16 that δ0 is a function of δ1. We choose the same δ0
function here, and hence, it is sufficient to specify δ1. Also,
our choice of δ0, δ1 and δ2 will be such that δ2 < 1 as well
as the condition (56) appearing in the proof of Lemma 17
is satisfied, thereby implying that P(E2|M = m) → 0 as
n → ∞. As S is generated i.i.d., where Si ∼ N (0, σ2S), ∀i,
we have P(E0|M = m) → 0 as n → ∞ for δ0 > 0. From
Lemma 16, it follows that P(E1|M = m) → 0 as n → ∞
for δ1 > 0. As discussed earlier, P(E2|M = m) → 0 as
n → ∞ for δ2 > 0. Using Lemma 18, P(E3|M = m) → 0
as n → ∞ for δ3 > 0. Since Z is independent of U, S and
J, P(E4|M = m), P(E5|M = m) and P(E6|M = m) → 0
as n → ∞ for δ4 > 0, δ5 > 0 and δ6 > 0 respectively. Z
is an i.i.d. Gaussian vector, where Zi ∼ N (0, σ2), ∀i. Hence,
for δ7 > 0, P(E7|M = m) → 0 as n → ∞. Let us define
E = ∪7i=0Ei and let
V =
〈
Jˆ, Sˆ
〉
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W =
1
n
‖J‖2.
Since
∣∣∣ 〈Jˆ, Sˆ〉 ∣∣∣ ≤ 1, we have V 2 ≤ 1. It follows from ‖J‖2 ≤
nΛ, that 0 ≤ W ≤ Λ. Note that P(E|M = m) approaches 0
for large enough n for δi, i = 0, 1, . . . , 7 as given above.
Recall that the codewords are chosen over the surface of an
n-sphere of radius
√
nPU . Thus, from (61) and (62) as well
as conditioned on the event Ec,
〈Y,U〉 ≥ n
(
PU + (1− α)ασ2S + V α
√
Wσ2S − δa
)
, (63)
and
〈Y,Y〉 ≤ n
(
PU + (1− α)2σ2S +W + σ2 + 2(1− α)ασ2S
+2V α
√
Wσ2S + 2(1− α)V
√
Wσ2S + δb
)
. (64)
We know that 〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
=
〈Y,U〉
〈Y,Y〉 . (65)
Now substituting for 〈Y,U〉 from (63) and 〈Y,Y〉 from (64)
in (65), and noting that PU = P ′ + α2σ2S and α = P
′/(P ′ +
Λ + σ2), we get (66) (given on top of the next page), where
δa, δb > 0 and δa, δb → 0 as δi → 0, i = 0, 1, . . . , 6. Hence,
conditioned on Ec, we have〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
≥
√
α
(
P ′ + ασ2S + V α
√
Wσ2S
)
√
PU
(
P ′ + ασ2S + α(W − Λ) + 2V α
√
Wσ2S
) − δ˜, (67)
where δ˜ > 0 and δ˜ → 0 as δa, δb → 0. It can be verified
that there exists a choice of δi, i = 0, 1, . . . , 7, as functions
of δ, where ∀i, δi approaches 0 as δ → 0, such that, firstly,
δ0, δ1 and δ2 are such that δ2 < 1 and they satisfy (56) as
required in the proof of Lemma 17 earlier, and secondly, δ˜,
which depends on δi, ∀i, is such that δ˜ < δ. Making this
choice, conditioned on Ec, it follows from (67) that〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
≥
√
α
(
P ′ + ασ2S + V α
√
Wσ2S
)
√
PU
(
P ′ + ασ2S + α(W − Λ) + 2V α
√
Wσ2S
) − δ. (68)
We now make the following claim. The proof of this claim is
discussed later.
Claim 27. If
f(v, w) =
√
α
(
P ′ + ασ2S + vα
√
wσ2S
)
√
PU
(
P ′ + ασ2S + α(v − Λ) + 2vα
√
wσ2S
) (69)
then for all −1 ≤ v ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ w ≤ Λ,
f(v, w) ≥ θ,
where
θ = f(0,Λ)
=
√
α(P ′ + ασ2S)
PU
.
Using the above claim in (68), conditioned on Ec, it follows
that 〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
≥ θ − δ.
Thus, we can conclude that
P
(〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉
< θ − δ∣∣M = m) ≤ P(E|M = m)
→ 0
as n→∞. It only remains to prove Claim 27 above.
Proof of Claim 27: We show that for −1 ≤ v ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ w ≤ Λ,
f(v, w) ≥ f(0,Λ). (70)
Let us first establish the simple fact that f(v, w) ≥ 0. Consider
the numerator term in (69).
P ′ +ασ2S + vα
√
wσ2S
= P ′ + α
(
σ2S + v
√
wσ2S
)
(a)
= P ′ +
P ′
P ′ + Λ + σ2
(
σ2S + v
√
wσ2S
)
=
P ′
P ′ + Λ + σ2
(
P ′ + Λ + σ2 + σ2S + v
√
wσ2S
)
=
P ′
P ′ + Λ + σ2
·
(
P ′ + (Λ− w) + σ2 +
(
w + σ2S + v
√
wσ2S
))
(b)
≥ P
′
P ′ + Λ + σ2
·
(
P ′ + (Λ− w) + σ2 +
(
w + σ2S − 2
√
wσ2S
))
=
P ′
P ′ + Λ + σ2
(
P ′ + (Λ− w) + σ2 + (√w − σS)2)
(c)
≥ 0.
Here (a) follows by substituting α = P ′/(P ′+Λ+σ2). Then,
(b) follows since v ≥ −1, while (c) follows from w ≤ Λ.
Hence, we conclude that the numerator of (69) is non-negative,
and f(v, w) ≥ 0.
As f(v,Λ) ≥ 0 for −1 ≤ v ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ w ≤ Λ, to
show (70), it is sufficient to prove
(f(v, w))2 ≥ (f(0,Λ))2, (71)
for −1 ≤ v ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ w ≤ Λ. Hence, using (69) in (71),
we want to show that√α P ′ + ασ2S + vα√wσ2S√
PU (P ′ + ασ2S + α(w − Λ) + 2vα
√
wσ2S)
2
≥
(
√
α
√
P ′ + ασ2S√
PU
)2
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〈
Yˆ, Uˆ
〉 ≥
(
PU + (1− α)ασ2S + V α
√
Wσ2S − δa
)
√
PU
(
PU + (1− α)2σ2S +W + σ2 + 2(1− α)ασ2S + 2V
√
Wσ2S + δb
)
(a)
=
√
α
(
P ′ + ασ2S + V α
√
Wσ2S − δa
)
√
PU
(
P ′ + ασ2S + α(W − Λ) + 2V α
√
Wσ2S + αδb
) , (66)
⇔
 P ′ + ασ2S + vα√wσ2S√
P ′ + ασ2S + α(w − Λ) + 2vα
√
wσ2S
2
≥
(√
P ′ + ασ2S
)2
⇔
(
P ′ + ασ2S + vα
√
wσ2S
)2
P ′ + ασ2S + α(w − Λ) + 2vα
√
wσ2S
≥ P ′ + ασ2S
⇔
(
P ′ + ασ2S + vα
√
wσ2S
)2
≥ (P ′ + ασ2S)(P ′ + ασ2S + α(w − Λ) + 2vα√wσ2S)
⇔
(
vα
√
wσ2S
)2
≥ (P ′ + ασ2S)α(w − Λ).
Since w ≤ Λ, the RHS above is negative. However, −1 ≤ v ≤
1, and hence, v2 ≥ 0. Thus, (71) immediately follows and we
conclude that f(v, w) ≥ f(0,Λ), for −1 ≤ v ≤ 1 and w ≤ Λ.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
This completes the proof of Lemma 19.
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